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COMMENT
Crafting a Challenge to the Practice of Drug
Testing Welfare Recipients: Federal Welfare
Reform and State Response as the Most
Recent Chapter in the War on Drugs
CORNNE A- CAREYt
Autonomy is the death knell of authority, and authority knows it: hence
the ceaseless warfare of authority against the exercise, both real and
symbolic, of autonomy-that is, against suicide, against masturbation,
against self-medication.. 1
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom
are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rul-
ers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by
men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.2
INTRODUCTION
A cacophony of state voices responded to the opportunity
quietly granted by Congress in its passage of welfare reform leg-
t J.D. Candidate, June 1998, State University of New York at Buffalo School of
Law;, MA, American Studies, State University of New York at Buffalo. I would like to
thank Professors Lee Albert, Guyora Binder and Oren Zeve, as well as Patrick Maher
and Patricia Bell. I also want to thank Leila Hilal for her patient editorial skills, sup-
port, and insight while writing this article. The author gratefully acknowledges the
Harm Reduction Coalition, the North American Syringe Exchange Network, and the
Drug Policy Foundation for continually providing a forum for this work.
1. THOMAS SZASZ, CEREMONIAL CHEMISTRY: THE RITUAL PERS CION OF DRUGs, A)-
Dirs, AND PUSHERS 175 (1974).
2. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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islation,3 in August of 1996, by proposing a wide array of plans
to identify and sanction current and former drug users who ap-
ply for or who currently receive public assistance benefits. 4 Sec-
tion 902 of Title 9 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Op-
portunities Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRA) bestows a negative
grant of power on the states, allowing them to begin drug test-
ing welfare recipients and sanctioning those who test positive.
Section 902 provides that "[s]tates shall not be prohibited by the
Federal Government from testing welfare recipients for use of
controlled substances nor from sanctioning welfare recipients
who test positive for use of controlled substances" A mere sen-
tence contained in this mammoth6 and historic7 legislation pro-
vides states with a powerful weapon in their war on drugs.
This Comment will provide a detailed analysis of state re-
sponses to the two provisions of Federal Welfare Reform which
directly affect current and former drug users and suggest a liti-
gation strategy for challenging plans which seek to identify and
sanction drug users. I argue that random, suspicionless drug
testing of a class of indigents contravenes the Fourth Amend-
ment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures8 and
3. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (to be codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.) [hereinafter
PRA]. The PRA was passed by the House on July 31, 1996 by a vote of 328-101 with
Democrats almost evenly divided. The PRA was passed by the Senate on August 1, 1996
by a vote of 78-21-with all 53 Republicans voting for it, and Democrats divided 25-21.
President Clinton signed the PRA into law on August 22, 1996.
4. Several states incorporated mandatory drug testing of welfare recipients into
their welfare reform plans prior to the passage of the PRA. These plans were approved
state-by-state via waiver. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. States have since ap-
proved a wide variety of drug testing schemes in response, and have chosen to identify
drug users in a number of ways, from requiring that applicants and recipients state that
they are drug free, to utilizing urinalysis. See infra Part H & Appendix I (detailing indi-
vidual state responses). Reports on the accuracy of laboratory drug testing (testing of
blood, urine, sweat, or hair specimens) range from 25% to 97%. See infra note 121. For a
general overview of the mechanics of laboratory drug testing, see Karen Manfield, Com-
ment, Imposing Liability on Drug Testing Laboratories for "False Positives" Getting
Around Privity, 64 U. CHL L REV. 287, 290-92 (1997).
5. PRA, tit. IX, § 902.
6. The Act, in its final form, spans over three hundred pages.
7. See Robert Pear, Senate Passes Welfare Measure, Sending it for Clinton's Signa-
ture, N.Y. Tums, Aug. 2, 1996, at Al (noting that the "welfare [reform] bill would reverse
six decades of social policy, eliminating the Federal guarantee of cash assistance for the
nation's poorest children"). The new law "will end the 60-year-old guarantee of cash as-
sistance to the poor." Editorial, Welfare ill-reformed, ST. PEERSBURG TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1996,
at 14A.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "lhe right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affir-
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the due process clause and the equal protection guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment.9 I also contend that even well-
crafted state plans designed to steer clear of constitutional viola-
tions fail to do so, and additionally'contravene the Americans
with Disabilities Act and state constitution provisions.10 I con-
clude by maintaining that increasingly punitive measures levied
against welfare recipients in the war on drugs is neither legally
sound, nor wise or just public policy."
Get tough policies aimed at welfare recipients suspected of
using drugs reflect a growing antipathy expressed by main-
stream public opinion toward drug users,12 and drug users re-
ceiving public assistance in particular. 3 A 1989 Washington
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or thing to
be seized."
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 reads, in relevant part: "No state shall... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law." For a preliminary
statement addressing drug testing welfare recipients when it was a mere proposal, see
Laura W. Murphy, Director, American Civil Liberties Union Washington National Office,
ACLU Calls Proposal to Drug Test Welfare Recipients a "False Positive," May 22, 1996,
<http'/www.aclu.org/news/n052296.html> (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
10. See infra Part MA & M.D.
11. With one major thrust of welfare reform in this country being reduction in the
cost of public assistance programs and moving people "from welfare to work," a program
that will have negligible concrete benefits and is estimated to cost over $25 million a
year in New York State alone. While estimates vary, the figure $25 million a year is
based on multiplying the state's existing welfare population of 1.2 million by $18 per
test, and adding $3.4 million to cover new applicants, administration, and confirmatory
tests. Confirmatory tests cost about $25 a piece. See Murphy, supra note 9.
The Legal Action Center compiled research on the costs of drug testing. $65 a test
in one government-certified lab in Philadelphia ($35 a test with a large-volume dis-
count); $42-$76 a test in New York, $73.46 a test for drug testing federal employees. See
LEGAL AcTION CENTER REPoRT, MAKNG WELFARE REFoRM WoRm TooLs FOR CoNFRoNmING
ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROBLEMS AMONG WELFARE REcIPITs 45 (1997) [hereinafter MAMNG
WELFARE REFORM WoRK] (citing U.S. General Accounting Office, Employee Drug Testing:
Estimated Cost to Test All Executive Branch Employees and New Hires (June 1992);
American Management Association, 1996 AMA Survey-Workplace Drug Testing and
Drug Abuse Policies, Summary of Key Findings (1996)). The quotes compiled do not con-
template administrative costs or the costs of litigation arising from due process
challenges.
12. A look at recent legislative proposals dealing with drug crimes is one illustra-
tion of this antipathy. A Mississippi bill would make "trafficking in cocaine that leads 'to
a natural, though not inevitable, lethal result' a capital offense." Note, Recent Legisla-
tion: Welfare Reform-Punishment of Drug Offenders, 110 HARV. L REv. 983, 983 & n.3
(1997) [hereinafter Punishment of Drug Offenders] (quoting ILB. 1013, Reg. Sess. (Miss.
1996)). A variety of other proposed punishments for drug offenders include "flogging and
'cutting off a finger for each drug conviction.'" Id. (quoting DOUGLAS N. HusAK, DRUGS
AND RIGHTS 13 (1992)).
13. Louisiana drug consultant Bruce Wilkinson, commenting on his state's tough
new law, see infra note 91 and accompanying text, and Appendix I, nn15-16, recently
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Post/ABC News poll showed that fifty-five percent of those sur-
veyed favored mandatory drug testing of all people, and sixty-
seven percent favored drug testing for high school students.14 Al-
most half of all Fortune 500 companies currently have drug test-
ing procedures in place to screen job applicants for drug use,1"
and 89% of major American companies administer drug tests to
all new hires.16 The desire to identify drug users has turned into
a burgeoning business,17 with scores of drug testing companies
offering their services to private employers, 18 school administra-
tors, and parents.19
stated: "I do feel the public is ... in a mood to say if rm going to work hard in the mid-
dle class and give my money over more and more taxes for welfare [sic]... what are
you going to do to show me my money isn't going for drugs?" Random Drug Testing in
Louisiana (CNN Today television broadcast, Nov. 18, 1997) available in LEXIS, News
File, Transcript No. 97111804V13.
14. Philippa M. Guthrie, Drug Testing and Welfare: Taking the Drug War to Uncon-
stitutional Limits? 66 IND. L.J. 579, 580 (1991) (citing Tom Wicker, Rights vs. Testing,
N.Y. Tams, Nov. 28, 1989, at A25). Additionally, a 1989 poll showed that '52% of those
surveyed were willing to have their homes searched [and] 67% were willing to have their
cars stopped and searched without a warrant Id.
15. Michael Doyle, Drug Testing Habit Grows, SAcRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 9, 1997, at El
(citing Bureau of Labor Statistics which found that by 1991 40% of all Fortune 500 Com-
panies tested job applicants). Ninety-eight percent of all Fortune 200 companies drug
test their employees. David W. Lockard, Protecting Medical Laboratories from 7brt Lia.
bility for Drug Testing, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 427, 427 (1996).
16. YoJi Cole, Hi-Tech Drug Test Adhesive Patch Ushers in a New Era of Drug Test-
ing, LA WEEKLY, Nov. 29, 1996 at 12. See also Lockard, supra note 15, at 427 (stating
that 78% of employers conduct some sort of drug testing).
17. See Santiago v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 144, 150 (N.D.N.Y 1997)
(noting that "commercial laboratories earned a third of a billion dollars in testing reve-
nue as early as 1990") (citing Mark A. Rothsten, Workplace Drug Testing: A Case Study
in the Misapplication of Technology, 5 HARV. JL. & TEcm 65, 81 (1991)).
18. The National Association of Collection Sites (NACS), a trade association provid-
ing information to employers about drug testing issues "was founded in September 1995
as the industry trade association for sites performing drug and alcohol testing specimen
collections. Since its founding two years ago, NACS has grown to over 1700 members na-
tionwide." National Association of Collection Sites, Oct. 27, 1997, <http'//www.collection-
sites.org> (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
19. A company called Drug Alert offers "A Use-at-Home Drug Detection and Identi-
fication Kit for Concerned Parents":
a drug detection and identification kit based on the same proven technology
employed by law enforcement agencies worldwide. It detects microscopic
amounts of Cocaine, Crack Cocaine, Heroin, Methamphetamine, Marijuana,
LSD, and PCP. mThe kit contains a three-inch pre-moistened sample collector
which gathers minute-and usually invisible-drug traces when you wipe it
across desktops, telephones, books, door knobs, or other items .... you can
easily collect the traces that are virtually always present when someone is us-
ing illegal drugs. The traces are analyzed and identified at Barringer's labora-
tories. They can provide the information you need to address a potentially very
serious problems .... your kit is sent to you in a discreet envelope which con-
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Part I of this Comment demonstrates how the rhetoric and
hysteria of the war against drugs have propelled attempts to
curtail the civil liberties of drug users in the war on drugs at
the federal level, both prior to and following the passage of the
PRA. Part 11 identifies state plans which raise significant consti-
tutional issues. Part I suggests a litigation strategy for chal-
lenging state efforts to institute mandatory, suspicionless drug
testing, either by specific welfare reform legislation or by discre-
tion of individual state departments of social services, of a class
of indigents.20
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Genesis of the War on Drugs
In his comprehensive look at historical restrictions on civil
rights during times of war, Paul Finkelman observes that while
there is "no clear beginning to the war on drugs," the term "war
on drugs" was first used during the Nixon Administration.21 The
tains everything you need for a scientifically accurate test .... The results-
positive or negative-will be available in two weeks. If you wish to remain
anonymous, you may return the envelope with only the ID number supplied.
You can then telephone in for the results using only the ID number ....
PRICE: $35.00 EACH.
Drug Alert!, Oct. 26, 1997, <http:/Iwww.gdi.net/fohg/athome.htm> (on file with the Buf-
falo Law Review).
20. See generally Guthrie, supra note 14. Written before any concrete proposals for
drug testing welfare recipients were introduced, Guthrie lays the groundwork for the
constitutional analysis presented here. See also PAULA GABER, DRUG TESmNG OF AFDC
REc~mTrS (1996).
21. Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on
Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L REv. 1389, 1396 (1993). See also Steven B. Duke, Drug Prohibition:
An Unnatural Disaster, 27 CONN. L REv. 571, 589-90 (1995) (arguing that the rhetoric of
the drug war has been used to justify the curtailment of civil liberties). The roots of the
war on drugs stem from the passage of the Harrison Act in 1914, which was intended to
medicalize heroin and cocaine, which had not until then been criminalized. The Supreme
Court first used the Harrison Act to impose criminal penalties for prescribing such drugs
to addicts in Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919). See John C. McWilliams, The
History of Drug Control Policies in the United States, in Handbook of Drug Control in
the United States 29 (James A. Inciardi ed., 1990) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF DRUG CON-
TROL]. McWilliams explains that in an attempt to assess the efficacy of the Act, the Sec-
retary of the Treasury formed a committee to investigate drug use post-Harrison. He
writes:
[The committee's most dramatic finding was that the illicit use of narcotics
had increased while the act had been in effect... [but] instead of more closely
examining the weaknesses of the law... the committee simply stiffened the
penalties as committees have done repeatedly and ineffectively ever since.
Id. at 32.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Anti-drug Abuse Act of 198822 provided the foundation for fed-
eral policy and legislation in the war on drugs. An examination
of the provisions of the Act, and the rhetoric of the Reagan and
Bush Administrations, Congress, and the Office of National
Drug Control Policy, is critical to understanding the federal gov-
ernment's war on drugs.2 Referring to President Reagan's com-
mitment to end the drug problem at all costs, Steven Wisotsky
observed:
Ilegal scholars rarely pay much attention to Presidential rhetoric in ana-
lyzing legal developments. But, in this situation, it would be a serious
mistake to disregard the tough talk and political posturing. Attitude,
above all else, drives the counterrevolution in criminal law and proce-
dure .... This attitude [ending the drug problem by any means] propels
the trend toward creating a drug "exception to the law: if conduct is lit-
erally unforgivable, then draconian measures are justified.24
Just as Nancy Reagan's campaign to encourage children to
"Just Say No" guided the efforts of schools, churches, and com-
munity children's programs during the Reagan administration,2
George Bush's "zero tolerance" approach provided law enforce-
ment, the courts, Congress, and the United States Sentencing
Commission,26 with direction in establishing policies, procedures,
22. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. (1988)) repealed by 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501-08 (West
Supp. 1997). With this Act, President Ronald Reagan created the Office of National
Drug Control Policy, which was charged with developing a comprehensive national strat-
egy for corpbatting drugs.
23. See generally Diane M. Canova, The National Drug Control Strategy: A Synop-
sis, in Handbook of Drug Control, supra note 21, at 339 (providing a summary of the
1989 National Drug Control Strategy). See also Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine,
Punitive Prohibition in America, in CRAcK IN AMERIcA DEMON DRUGS AND SOcIAL JUSTICE
321 (Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine eds., 1997) [hereinafter CRAcK IN AMERICA].
Reinarman and Levine trace the roots of "zero tolerance" rhetoric to the ideological ex-
tremisim of the punitive prohibitionists, exemplified by the 1926 book Opium the Demon
Flower, which stated that: "Leadership in the nation-wide fight against addiction has
thus been definitely taken by America's federal government. The problem henceforth is
one of administration .... What is needed is more inspection; more inspectors; more
certain and more severe punishment; more imprisonment... ." Id. at 325 (quoting GA-
HA-MuLuAL, OPium THE DEMON FLOwER 240-41 (1926)).
24. Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of
Rights, 38 HAsTiNGs L.J. 889, 891 (1987).
25. The "Just Say No" approach to drug control was adopted just as the Reagan ad-
ministration 'began its disengagement from the drug abuse treatment business Duane
McBride et al., AIDS, IV Drug Use, and the Federal Agenda, in HANDBOOK OF DRUo CON-
TROL, supra note 21, at 275. See also LYNN ZIMMER & JOHN P. MORGAN, MARIJUANA
MYTHs, MARIJUANA FACTS: A REVW OF THE ScIENTmcIC EVIDENCE 143 (1997).
26. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Title II of the Comprehensive Crime Con-
trol Act of 1984) established the United States Sentencing Commission, an independent
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and laws which virtually eliminate consideration of the civil lib-
erties of drug users. In 1989, Bush proclaimed that
[tihe policy of this Administration is "zero tolerance." No amount of drug
use is acceptable. And, zero tolerance should be the policy of every state
in the Union-of every county and town, of every school, business, and
community group-in fact, of every American.27
While many thought that the harshness of the war on drugs
would abate with the election of President Clinton in 1992,28
and many contend that it has,2 9 Presidential rhetoric and pro-
agency in the judicial branch whose members are appointed by the President, to develop
federal sentencing guidelines. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1988), and 28
U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)). United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, In-
troduction (1996) [hereinafter USSG].
None of the members [of the original Commission] had extensive experience in
sentencing offenders in a high-volume urban court... [there was no ... fed-
eral defender or private attorney skilled in criminal representation and sen-
tencing advocacy, and no federal probation officer who had analyzed a wide
range of offender characteristics or devised punishment options to match of-
fenders' risks or rehabilitative potential.
See also Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable
Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1741 (1992). The power of the
Sentencing Guidelines goes beyond merely creating a uniform federal sentencing
scheme. Id. The departure scheme constructed by the USSG, whereby a sentencer is au-
thorized to take certain factors into consideration to justify either an upward or a down-
ward departure to the mandated sentence, can be used to require a sentencer to rely on
illegal evidence. Id. at 1739 (citing United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256 (2d Cir.
1992)). In Tejada, "the prosecutor... who had to drop firearm possession charges at
trial because the evidence was illegally obtained, was still able to use the defendants il-
legal gun possession to enhance the sentence for related drug charges." Id. at 1740.
Freed argues that "[t]ogether, the Tejada decision and the guidelines' relevant conduct
approach significantly reduce the disincentives for police and prosecutors to obtain ille-
gal evidence." Id. (emphasis added). Guidelines relating to drug offenses and proportion-
ate sentencing for specific amounts of controlled substances can be found in Part D 'Of-
fenses Involving Drugs," USSG, supra, §§ 2D1.1 - 2D.3.2.
27. Guthrie, supra note 14, at 579 (quoting GEORGE BUSH, BUILDING A BETTER
AmERiCA, SuPPLEmENT TO THE MESSAGE DELIVERED TO THE JOnT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS
66 (Feb. 9, 1989)).
28. Early in his administration, Clinton "supported shifting the federal approach to
drug use from punishment to drug treatment and rehabilitation" of those addicted to
drugs, and proposed to launch a "'multifaceted offensive' that [would include] 'more and
better education, more treatment, more rehabilitation.'" Nancy E. Marion, Symbolic Pol-
icies in Clinton's Crime Control Agenda, 1 BUFF. CRIm L. REv. 67, 72 & n.20 (1997)(quoting Clinton's Remarks on the Swearing-In of National Drug Control Policy Director
Lee Brown, PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 967 (1993)).
29. Charles Rangel, a democratic member of the House of Representatives from
Manhattan "accused Clinton of going AWOL in the drug war and pointedly said he
miss[ed] Nancy Reagan's 'Just Say No' campaign!" Thomas Galvin & Deborah Orin,
Teens' Drug Abuse: Dole Uses Shocking Report to Bash Bill, N.Y. POST, Aug. 11, 1996, at
BUFFALO LAW RIEW[l
posals reveal that the drug war has increased in intensity. Com-
paring the rhetoric of President Reagan in 1986 to Clinton's re-
cent remarks, Joshua Shenk, a correspondent for The
Economist, contends that "the Clinton administration has taken
the Republican drug war to soaring new heights of draconian in-
effectiveness." 30 Shenk compared Reagan's views on key drug
policy issues to Clinton's. While Reagan supported mandatory
drug testing of safety-sensitive employees, for example, air traf-
fic controllers and federal agents who carry guns, he preferred a
voluntary program. Reagan also did not believe jailing drug
users would solve the problem; he felt that treatment was the
better solution. Additionally, Reagan believed executing drug
dealers would be "counterproductive."3 '
In contrast, Clinton has proposed testing drivers license ap-
plicants,3 2 expanding the death penalty for drug dealers,33 and
drug testing federal parolees. 34 Furthermore, Clinton supports
"longer mandatory prison sentences, broader interdiction efforts,
more money for law enforcement,"3 5 and mandatory drug testing
of high school athletes.36 In 1996 the Clinton administration re-
jected a recommendation from the United States Sentencing
Commission to reduce or eliminate the disparity in mandatory
sentencing laws which punish individuals who sell crack at
2.
30. Joshua Wolf Shenk, The Drug War: Tougher Than Ever, Still a Bust, INTL HER-
ALD TRm., Oct. 31, 1996.
31. Id.
32. A $2 million pilot program to drug test driver's license applicants is included in
the proposed Reauthorization of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of
1991 (ISTEA). Hon. Mortimer L. Downey, Deputy Secretary of Transportation, Prepared
Statement Before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Subcommit-
tee on Transportation and Infrastructure (Feb. 13, 1997), in FED. NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 13,
1997. See also Shenk, supra note 30; Leaders of Each Party Say Congress Will be Theirs,
USA TODAY, Oct. 21, 1996, at 8A; John Aloysius Farrell, Critics Hit Clinton Teen-Age
Drug Testing Plan; Many See Proposal on Licenses as Invasion of Privacy, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 23, 1996, at A17.
33. See Shenk, supra note 30. See also Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. VI, § 60013, 108 Stat. 1796.
34. See Burt Solomon, Because of the Election, Parolees Face Testing for Drugs, 28
NAT'L J. 2304 (1996). Clinton signed an Executive Order on Dec. 18, 1995, ordering drug
testing of all federal prisoners. His new initiative focuses on conditioning grants for the
building of new prisons on states' compliance with Clinton's plan to drug test federal pa-
rolees. Id.
35. See Shenk, supra note 30.
36. The Clinton administration submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court
supporting the policy in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 US. 646 (1995). Joe
Lockhart, Clinton Administration Compares Anti-Drug Record with GOP Drug Record,
U.S. NEWSWME, Aug. 21, 1996.
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rates ten times as harsh as those who sell powder cocaine.37
Clinton also sought to influence the judiciary and its treatment
of drug issues in the media as well.38 Requesting over $15 bil-
lion from Congress, and increasing the funding of the Drug En-
forcement Administration (DEA) by eighteen percent, Clinton
proposed the largest anti-drug budget ever for fiscal year 1997.39
Set against a backdrop of increasing punitiveness, Clinton's fail-
ure to address such issues as accessible treatment, approval of
needle-exchange programs which are shown to reduce the
spread of 1IV among injection drug users,4 and the provision of
37. See Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, Real Opposition, Real Alternatives: Re-
ducing the Harms of Drug Use and Drug Policy, in CRACK IN AMERICA, supra note 23, at.
351.
38. The case of US. District Judge Harold Baer is a perfect example. In January
1996, Judge Baer ruled to exclude evidence in a drug case based upon his finding that
the police in the case did not have reasonable suspicion to search the trunk of a car. The
police who conducted the search cited the fact that suspects in the case fled the scene,
but Judge Baer found that in Washington Heights, the neighborhood where the incident
took place, it is common for people to fear the police and flee. Baer was bombarded with
criticism for his ruling by Clinton and numerous other political figures, including then-
Senator Bob Dole. Baer subsequently allowed the evidence to be admitted, and eventu-
ally removed himself from the case. See Don Van Natta Jr., Not Suspicious to Flee Police,
Judge Declares, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 25, 1996, at BI; Clifford Krauss, Giuliani and Bratton
Assail US. Judge's Ruling in Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1996, at 25; Ian Fisher,
Gingrich Asks Judge's Ouster for Ruling Out Drug Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1996, at
B4; Alison Mitchell, Clinton Pressing Judge to Relent, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 22, 1996, at Al;
Don Van Natta Jr., Under Pressure, Federal Judge Reverses Decision in Drug Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 1996, at Al; An Alert from the Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1996, at
A24; Don Van Natta Jr., Judge Baer Takes Himself Off Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
1996, at B1; Larry Neumeister, Judge Withdraws from Drug Case, Clinton, Dole, Both
Criticized for Decision to Exclude Evidence, DAILY REc. (Baltimore), May 20, 1996.
39. See Lockhart, supra note 36.
40. Half of all new HIV infections each year are the direct result of contaminated
syringes. See Barbara Vobejda, AIDS Panel Sends Rebuke to Clinton, WAs u PoSr, Mar.
17, 1998, at A12. On March 17, 1998, a 30-member Presidential Advisory Council on
HIV and AIDS demanded that the administration lift the federal ban on funding for
needle exchange programs. Id. The Council "voted unanimously to express 'no confidence'
in the administration's commitment to stop new AIDS infections. Id. Noting that [tihis
may be the first time in history a presidential council has turned to the president and
said, 'We have no confidence in you,'" Steve Sternberg, Needle-exchange money de-
manded Clinton's AIDS panel doubts resolve, USA TODAY, Mar. 17, 1998, at ID, the
Council claimed that "it is a lack of political will, not scientific evidence, that is creating
this failure to act." Vobejda, supra.
In February of 1997, Health and Human Services Secretary Donna Shalala stopped
just short of recommending that the 1993 federal ban on needle exchange funding im-
posed by Congress be lifted. Laurie Garrett, Needle Exchange Debate; Shalala Releases
an Inconclusive Report, NEWSDAY, Feb. 19, 1997, at A19. Shalala is legally empowered to
'unilaterally lift the... ban... but has chosen not to do so" because, notwithstanding
scientific studies which have shown the opposite, Shalala has "not yet concluded that
needle exchange programs do not encourage drug use. Id. Despite the endorsement of
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treatment for addicts at high risk of contracting HIV and other
diseases highlights his approach of playing to politics and
imagery.41
B. Federal Legislation
The Anti-drug Abuse Act of 198842 is the seminal piece of
federal legislation addressing the widespread use of drugs and
the problems associated with drug use-crime, violence, and
poverty.43 The stated goal of the Anti-drug Abuse Act was to
"create a Drug-Free America by 1995."44 To that end, the Act
needle exchange as an effective HIV prevention strategy by the American Medical Asso-
ciation, the American Bar Association, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the American
Public Health Association, and a National Institutes of Health report, the administration
has not wavered in its refusal to change current federal policy in this area. See John
Gibeaut & James Podgers, Pointed Argument: House Passes Needle Exchange Policy over
Intense Opposition, ABA J. Oct. 1996, at 106; Morning Edition (NPR radio broadcast,
Dec. 8, 1997); Vobejda, supra; John W. Fountain, Protest at Agency Targets Rule on Nee-
dle Exchange: Hundreds Rally at HHS for Return of Funding, WASH. PosT, Sept. 18,
1997, at A17. Despite studying the efficacy of needle exchange for over five years, Sandy
Thurman, White House AIDS policy chief, has defended the federal governmens intran-
sigence on this issue by maintaining that the "epidemic gets more complex every
day .... we are looking at issues that are more difficult, both politically and practi-
cally, to deal with" Morning Edition, supra. For information about the efficacy of needle
exchange programs, see generally Lawrence 0. Gostin, et a]., Prevention of HIVIAIDS
and Other Blood-Borne Diseases Among Injection Drug Users: A National Survey on the
Regulation of Syringes and Needles, 227 JAMA 53 (1997).
41. See id.; see also Robyn E. Blumner, Tough-Guy Clinton Overrides Bill of Rights,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 23, 1996, at 3; Steven R. Salbu, Needle Exchange, H1V
Transmission, and Illegal Drug Use: Informing Law and Public Policy with Science and
Rational Discourse, 33 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 105 (1996).
42. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
43. For statistics on drug use in the United States, see generally Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) Office of Applied Studies, Ad-
vance Report No. 18, Aug. 1996, <http:/lwww.samhsa.gov> (on file with the author and
the Buffalo Law Review); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, tit. V, § 5251(a), 21 U.S.C.
§ 1502 note (1988); See also infra note 83 (examining prevalence of drug use in welfare
population). Reliable statistics on drug use among either the general population or the
population of welfare recipients are nearly impossible to generate. Jeff Leen, an investi-
gative reporter for the Washington Post, remarked in an interview on National Public
Radio:
There are more than 50 databases of drug statistics. Everybody from the Jus-
tice Department to NIDA [the National Institute on Drug Abuse] to ... health
agencies. Everybody's got a little piece of the drug war, so they produce statis-
tical databases from which you can make measures. So there are hundreds of
measures.... You can find the numbers to support whatever thesis about the
drug war that you want to put out there.
Drug War Numbers (All Things Considered, NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 2, 1998).
44. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, tit. V, § 5251(b) (codified at 21 US.C. § 1502 note
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provided for the imposition of the death penalty for certain
drug-related killings,45 the denial of certain federal benefits such
as contracts, loans, and licenses to those convicted of drug pos-
session and trafficking;46 provided for the eviction of public
housing tenants involved in "drug-related criminal activity";47
established a demonstration program to drug test criminal de-
fendants;4 and required federal agencies to develop drug testing
procedures for all current employees and future applicants.49
Recent changes to the Social Security Act imposes addi-
tional civil disabilities on drug users. Precluded from eligibility
for Social Security benefits (SSI) are individuals for whom "alco-
holism or drug addiction is a contributing factor material to the
... determination that the individual is disabled 50
(1988)).
45. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, tit. VII, § 7001.
46. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, tit. V, § 5301 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 862 (1997)).
First time drug traffickers can be denied these benefits for five years, third-time traffick-
ers permanently. Specifically excluded from the list of deniable benefits were welfare and
public housing.
47. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, tit. V, § 5101 (amending Section 6(1) of the United
States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437(dXl)) (codified at 42 US.C. § 1437d(1X5)
(1990)).
For any grievance concerning an eviction or termination of tenancy that in-
volves any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peace-
ful enjoyment of the premises of other tenants or employees of the public hous-
ing agency or any drug-related criminal activity on or near such premises, the
agency may,
inter alia, institute an expedited grievance procedure allowing for a speedier eviction,
and restrict the rights of tenants to examine all the documents in the possession of
PHA. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k)(6). 'Cause for termination of tenancy is defined by the stat-
ute as any criminal activity which threatens the health and safety of any other tenant.
Id. § 1437d(l)(5). The statute defines drug-related activity to include the use of con-
trolled substances. Anyone who is evicted from public housing is precluded from apply-
ing for residency for three years or until he or she successfully completes treatment ap-
proved by the PHA. Id § 1437d(r). .
48. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, tit. VII, § 7304 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3154
(1988)).
49. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, tit. V, §§ 5151-52 (creating the Drug Free Work-
place Act of 1988)).
50. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1382 (A)(i)(D (1996). Such individuals must comply with the previ-
sions of the Act in order to continue receiving SSI and are subject to a schedule of sus-
pension if they fail to comply. For example, individuals for whom addiction is a contrib-
uting, material factor to a determination of disability are required to undergo treatment
at a facility approved by the Commissioner of Social Security. Id. § 1382 (A)(iiXI)(aa).
Since the law went into effect, nearly 197,000 people stand to lose their SSI benefits as
a result. See Melanie Conklin, Out in the Cold: Washington Shows Drug Addicts the
Door: Impacts of Federal Welfare Reform, Tax PRo IEsssvE, Mar. 1997, at 25. Conklin re-
ports that of the 135,000 appeals that have been filed, 53,000 have been granted and
52,000 denied. Id. Conklin discussed the practical impact of this law, including inter-
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While these provisions represent the successful enactment
of federal civil legislation dealing with drugs and their concomi-
tant problems, attempts to pass more stringent legislation, and
the debates surrounding such legislation, are illustrative precur-
sors to the harsh provisions of the PRA.5'
The proposed Family Welfare Reform Act of 198752 "pro-
vided for the denial of benefits to any welfare recipient who had
withdrawn from a treatment program before its completion. The
recipient could become eligible for benefits again upon reenter-
ing treatment, or upon a 'medical determination' that he or she
was drug free."53 The provision was dropped before the Senate
passed the Family Support Act of 1988.
Several recent proposals which failed to garner enough
votes for passage specifically attempted to condition welfare re-
ceipt on drug testing. The language of these proposals, which
were some of the first attempts to use drug testing as form of
drug control in the context of welfare, foreshadow individual
states' constructions of their own public assistance plans.5 Sen-
ator John Ashcroft, a leading drug war crusader in the Senate,
proposed several amendments during the course of federal legis-
lative debates.
In 1995 Senator Ashcroft proposed an amendment to the
views with SSI recipients likely to lose benefits, and predicted that homeless rates will
skyrocket. One woman described her search for work after her benefits had been cut:
'dozens of work applications-mostly for dishwashing jobs-but... no offers." Id. Conk-
lin wrote that '[s~he guesses it was because she had to admit on the applications that
she has a felony conviction. Id. Conklin quoted the woman:
I've been clean for a year and seven months, but I still need to talk to my psy-
chiatrist and take my medication .... Stopping the money doesn't bother me,
but they stopped the medical part, too .... Im not giving up. The main thing
is to keep fighting and to keep my dignity.
Id.
See also Alex Kral, Jennifer Lorvick, & Ricky Bluthenthal, Impact of Withdrawal of SSI
Disability Benefits for Injection Drug Users in San Francisco Bay Area, Presentation at
International Conference for the Reduction of Drug-Related Harm, Paris (Mar. 1997) (on
file with the Buffalo Law Review).
51. See PRA § 115 (denying assistance and benefits to individuals convicted of cer-
tain drug-related offenses) and PRA § 902 (authorizing states to inplement drug testing
provisions).
52. H.R. 1720, 100th Cong. § 809 (1987).
53. Guthrie, supra note 14, at 584.
54. Examination of failed proposals and the reasons why they failed are instructive
in predicting the success of future proposals. While many of Missouri Senator John Ash-
crofts proposals failed, the proposed "provisions are useful in sizing up Ashcroft's pro-
clivity for using welfare reform as a cure for all ills," and can accurately predict the
course of future action. Deborah Mathis, Ashcroft Wanted to Use Welfare Reform for
Drug Fight, GANNEm NEws SEav., July 19, 1996.
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Job Training Act, which passed the Senate by a vote of 54-43.55
The amendment sought to "establish a requirement that individ-
uals submit to drug tests and to ensure that applicants and par-
ticipants make full use of benefits extended through work force
employment activities."56 The bill was reported in the House on
July 25, 1996, but never went to the House floor for a vote.57
Ashcroft proposed another amendment containing a provi-
sion explicitly conditioning the receipt of welfare on the drug
use-status of a recipient or applicant. The language is unequivo-
cal, authorizing testing "[t]o ensure that welfare recipients are
drug free as a condition for receiving welfare assistance."5 The
measure passed the Senate by a vote of 50-47. 59 Subsequently, a
point of order that the amendment was in violation of Senate
rules governing budget bills was sustained and the amendment
was ruled out of order.60
Ashcroft's success is embodied in what is now Section 902 of
the PRA, authorizing the states to develop drug testing proce-
dures for welfare recipients and for sanctioning those who test
positive.61
Another leading drug war proponent in the Senate, Texas
Senator Phil Gramm, was similarly successful, both in his pro-
posed amendments to the Anti-drug Abuse Act of 1988 and the
PRA.62 Speaking on his amendment to the Anti-drug Abuse Act
to deny federal benefits to anyone convicted of a drug offense,
Gramm invoked powerful images of predatory drug users de-
55. 141 CONG. REc. S14941 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1995) (Ashcroft Amendment No.
2893). Republicans voted 42-10 and Democrats 12-33.
56. 141 CONG. REc. S14941-S14945 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1995) (Ashcroft Amendment
No. 2893 to S.143, the Workforce Development Act of 1995); 141 CONG. REc. D1189 (daily
ed. Oct. 11, 1995).
57. 142 CoNG. REC. S8105 (daily ed. July 18, 1996) (amendment 4901 offered by
Senator Ashcroft); Telephone Interview with Annie Billings, Legislative Assistant to Sen-
ator John Ashcroft (Sept. 18, 1996).
58. 142 Cong. Rec. S8105 (daily ed. July 18, 1996) (Ashcroft Amendment 4901 to
Personal Responsibility, Work Opportunity, Medicaid Restructuring Act).
59. Id. at S8108-09. Republicans voted 44-8, and Democrats 6-39. Id.
60. Billings Interview, supra note 57; see also Cheryl Wetzstein, Democrats Blocked
on Welfare Reform; Senate Slates Final Vote for Tuesday, WASM TIMEs, July 20, 1996, at
A3.
61. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Senators Dole and Ashcroft co-
authored a 'Sense of the Congress7 resolution 'specifying that states could drug test wel-
fare recipients and sanction those testing positive for drug use" in May 1996 which
passed the Senate 92-8. John Ashcroft, Ashcroft Proposes Drug-Free Requirement for Wel-
fare, CONG. PREss RELEASES, July 18, 1996.
62. See Punishment of Drug Offenders, supra note 12 (analyzing the effects and
logic of the 1996 Gramm Amendment).
1998] 293
294 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
stroying the future of our country and the happiness of our
children:
[S]ome think that this [amendment] is too harsh. Quite frankly, though,
I think the American people are ready to grab by the throat those who
profiteer off the health, happiness and lives of our children. That is the
purpose of that provision and that is, of course, what the purpose of the
death penalty [sic), which is also a part of this bill.63
The amendment, despite vigorous opposition,64 passed the Sen-
ate by a vote of 78 to 11,65 and accurately foreshadowed the suc-
cess of Gramm's 1996 contribution to the PRA. Section 115 im-
poses a ban on public assistance to anyone convicted of a drug-
related felony.6
63. 134 CONG. REc. S15964 (daily ed., Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
The bill's death penalty provision dealt with the imposition of the penalty for an aggra-
vated homicide involving a drug transaction.
64. Senator Dale Bumpers responded to Gramm's comments on the amendment by
saying.
Nobody wants to be mean spirited. We want to be tough and we want to be
dramatic and, God knows, every Member of this body wants to do something
about drugs. We all agree that drugs are eroding the moral fabric of the Na-
tion., But just to grow hair on your chest here on the Senate floor so you can
send out press releases back home and tell everybody how tough you are on
drugs is no solution. It is a multifaceted problem and the solutions are
multifaceted.
134 CONG. REc. S15971 (statement of Sen. Bumpers). Bumpers advocated for judicial dis-
cretion in the revocation of benefits, arguing that '[i]t is hard for a mother and her chil-
dren to say no when a woman is living on $360 a month SSI and all of a sudden her 18-
year-old son starts bringing in $15,000 a week. It is hard to say no." Id. He was also
concerned that the punitive nature of the amendment would do little to address the real
problems associated with drug use, and might actually exacerbate them. He described a
situation where someone just released from jail on a drug charge would be ineligible for
cash assistance, job training, public housing, and student loans. Bumpers said:
Now, you can take the position, 'Well, he brought it on himself,' and that is all
well and good. But I can tell you one other thing. If we insist on that position,
it is not he who will suffer, it is we who will suffer. Because he has no choice
but to go back doing the only thing he knows how to do, and that is to traffic
in drugs.
I& at 515972. Senator Christopher Dodd suggested that criminal statutes already in ex-
istence suffice to punish illicit drug use.
If we want to talk about a penalty that really creates deterrence, and if the
Senator from Texas has no qualms about it and really wants to stop drug use,
and especially drug pushing, why not adopt the Moslem way of doing things-
cut off a hand for a first conviction, cut off the other one for a second convic-
tion? That would be a deterrent.
I& at S15970 (remarks of Sen. Dodd).
65. Id. at S15976.
66. PRA § 115. The Gramm Amendment 'permanently denies cash assistance and
food stamps to anyone convicted under state or federal law of a felony offense that 'has
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II. DRUG TESTING IN THE CONTEXT OF WELFARE: THE LANDSCAPE
Receipt of public assistance has been tied to some form of
social control throughout the history of public charity-from re-
quirements to participate in religious activities and forced accul-
turation, to recent efforts controlling morality and family struc-
ture.67 Welfare exists within an "aura of suspicion"76 and has
long been considered the equivalent of charity... its recipients... sub-
jected to all kinds of dehumanizing experiences in the government's ef-
fort to police its welfare payments. In fact, over half a billion dollars are
expended annually for administration and policing in connection with the
[AFDC] program. Why such large sums are necessary for administration
and policing has never been adequately explained. No such sums are
spent policing the government subsidies granted to farmers, airlines,
steamship companies, and junk mail dealers, to name but a few. The
truth is that in this subsidy area society has simply adopted a double
standard, one for aid to business and the farmer and a different one for
welfare.6
9
as an element the possession, use, or distribution of a controlled substance:" Punish-
ment of Drug Offenders, supra note 12, at 983 (quoting PRA § 115(a)). The provision ap-
plies only to those convicted after August 22, 1996. Exempted from the statute are emer-
gency medical services, short-term, non-cash, in-kind emergency disaster relief, prenatal
care, job training, and drug treatment programs, PRA § 115(f), and "does not apply to
'convictions occurring on or before [the law's] enactment.' Punishment of Drug Offend-
ers, supra note 12, at 984 n.5 (quoting PRA § 115(d)(2)). The Gramm amendment is
likely to deny welfare eligibility to as many as 200,000 people a year. Id. at 987-88, n.29
(citing Department of Justice statistics showing that over 300,000 people a year are con-
victed of felony offenses). The amendment contains a state "opt-out" provision which al-
lows states to continue providing public assistance to convicted drug felons if such states
enact affirmative legislation opting out of PRA § 115. See infra Appendix H for a de-
tailed analysis of individual state responses to § 115.
Gramm's 1988 amendment was careful to exclude means-tested federal benefits
(public assistance), and the exclusion was evoked several times in the course of the de-
bates to show that the amendment was not so harsh. A growing public intolerance of
welfare and an escalation in the war on drugs made the passage of Gramm's 1996
amendment possible.
Possession of a small amount of marijuana for personal use is considered a felony in
only two states-Arizona and Nevada. See Welfare Bill Eliminates Benefits for Drug
Felons, MARIUANA PoLY REP., July/Aug. 1996, <http'//www.mpp.org/welfare.html> (on
file with author and the Buffalo Law Review). However, cultivation of a single mari-
juana plant is a federal felony, and a felony in almost every state. Selling a small
amount to a friend is also a felony. Id.
67. See FRANCES Fox PrvEN & RIcHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE PooR THE
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (1993), MIMI ABRAMOvn REGULATING THE LIVES OF WO-
MEN: SocIAL WELFARE POUCY FROM COLONIAL TMEs To THE PREsENT (1996). City mission
shelters often require participation in religious services in return for room and board,
and attendance at parenting classes or NA and AA groups are frequently a requirement
even in nonsectarian shelters.
68. Wyman v. James, 400 US. 309, 332 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Efforts to control drug use are not new to public assistance
plans,70 but directly conditioning the receipt of subsistence bene-
fits on a negative drug test is a development of the 1990s-in-
dicative of the turn of the 1960s war on poverty and the 1980s
war on drugs to a war on the poor and on drug users.
One of the first efforts to merge drug control with welfare
policy came in 1989 with a drug testing proposal in the Louisi-
ana State Legislature. Couched in the language of "promoting
the safety and welfare of children and adults," House Bill 303
"provided that all adults in public assistance programs be tested
for drugs, and that individuals with positive test results be sus-
pended from benefits programs until they completed education
69. Skelly Wright, Poverty, Minorities, and Respect for Law, 1970 DuXE L.J. 425,
437-38 (1970).
70. See, eg., New York's Social Services Law in effect immediately prior to its Sum-
mer 1997 welfare reform plan, which provided for the imposition of certain requirements
and sanctions against applicants for or recipients of home relief for whom drug or alco-
hol abuse was a "primary cause of his or her need for public assistance:' N.Y. Soc. SERv.
LAw § 158-a (1996); N.Y. CoMP. CoDEs R. & REOs. tit. 18, § 370.2 (d)(7Xi) (1996). Social
service officials had the authority pursuant to the law to require the applicant or recipi-
ent to "participate in an appropriate rehabilitative program, when available," and fur-
ther provided that "[sluch participation in rehabilitative programs ... shall be a condi-
tion of eligibility for the granting or continuation of public assistance to such applicant
or recipient.: N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 158-a. The law also provided a schedule of sanctions
for noncompliant recipients and applicants.
Requiring applicants and recipients to participate in rehabilitative programs de
facto exposes them to random drug testing (although some would argue not suspi-
cionless, for they were assigned to programs upon some degree of suspicion). Although
there were no challenges to the constitutionality of this kind of drug testing, the inquiry
would center on the availability of the results of drug tests to those outside the treat-
ment facility. If someone tested positive while in treatment, that person would be re-
ported to social services and sanctioned. One step removed from the process, the deter-
mination of the social services official results in the testing, and the department of social
services would indirectly have access to the results of a recipients drug test.
Although this type of testing has never been challenged against the due process pro-
visions of the Fourteenth Amendment, the fact that involuntary treatment-failure to
participate resulting in the suspension or loss of benefits-can be imposed as a result of
the determination of a single social services official without any specialized training in
substance abuse or addiction-not to mention detecting such abuse or addiction-, Tele-
phone Interview with Ms. Brown, Office of Alcohol and Substance Abuse Services of the
State of New York (OASAS) (July 17, 1996), is evidence of a scant amount of due pro-
cess. Comparable federal regulations specify that a railroad must have reasonable suspi-
cion before requiring an employee to submit to drug testing. 49 C.FR. § 219.300(aXl)
(1998). Such determination of reasonable suspicion "must be based on specific, contempo-
raneous, articulable observations ... : Id. at § 219.300(aX2). In order to require a urine
drug test, such observations must "be made by two supervisors, at least one of whom is
trained," id. § 219.300(b)(2), "in the signs and symptoms of alcohol and drug influence,
intoxication and misuse... [and] such training shall not be less than 3 hours." 49 C.FR.
§ 219.11(g).
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and rehabilitation programs and passed follow-up drug tests 71
Prior to the passage of the PRA, federal "waivers" were re-
quired before states enacted any revisions in their welfare
schemes which deviated from federal policies.7 2 South Carolina,
the recipient of one such waiver, became the first state to make
drug testing part of its welfare program. 73
In a plan implemented on October 1, 1996, welfare recipi-
ents in South Carolina who have "drug or alcohol related ar-
rest[s]... or if a mother gives birth to a baby showing signs of
maternal drug abuse, or if the social worker sees symptoms of
illegal drug use, the welfare recipient is shuttled off to the
state's alcohol and drug abuse department," where he or she is
screened and sent to a treatment program.74 No sanctions are
imposed if the recipient complies with the treatment program
requirements. However, recipients will be sanctioned if "it is
confirmed that they have used drugs," or if they refuse
treatment.75
A plan introduced by a bi-partisan Maryland legislative
committee to the Maryland General Assembly in early Decem-
ber of 1996 would have required the testing of all applicants for
Temporary Cash Assistance, Maryland's AFDC program.76 Re-
71. Guthrie, supra note 14, at 585 (citing H.R. 1303, Reg. Sess. (La., 1989)).
72. Section 1115 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1990) authorized the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to waive various provisions of the Social Secur-
ity Act to allow states to experiment with different methods of delivering public assis-
tance. Likewise, the Secretary of Agriculture can waive provisions of the Food Stamp
Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1964).
73. See William Booth, Florida County Sets Drug Tests for Welfare Clients, WAsr.
Posr, Sept. 17, 1996, at A3. See also Dave Williams, Beasley, Republican Governors Tout
Dole Tax Plan, STATES Nuws SFRv., Sept. 17, 1996 (noting that South Carolina's 'reason-
able suspicion" requirement for drug testing was the result of the Clinton administra-
tion's delay of 11 months in approving a federal waiver). Prior to the passage of the
PRA, four states had waivers to require substance abuse treatment as a condition of
welfare receipt: Utah, Kansas, Oregon, and South Carolina. See Julie Strawn, Substance
Abuse and Welfare Reform Policy, Feb. 24, 1998, <http://www.welfareinfor.org/
strawnmhtm> (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
74. See Williams, supra note 73.
75. Id.
76. See Jon Jeter, Md. May Tie Drug Testing, Welfare Cash, WAS.L PosT, Dec. 4,
1996, at Al [hereinafter Jeter I]; see also William F. Zorzi, Md. Welfare Plan Would Test
Applicants for Drug Use: Abusers Would Face Treatment Program, Possible Loss of Bene-
fits, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 4, 1996, at Al; DeWayne Wickham, Md. Welfare Drug-Testing
Plan a Model for Others, USA TODAY, Dec. 11, 1996, at A15. Sanctions would only have
applied if treatment was available under Maryland's plan. Zorzi, supra. Already the wait
for treatment in some Maryland counties is two months long;, the number of people seek-
ing drug counseling could double if the plan is implemented. See Jon Jeter, Drug Testing
Plan Could Balloon Md. Welfare Cost: Influx of People Seeking Treatment Would Sap Re-
sources, Analysts Say, WASH POsT, Dec. 5, 1996, at El [hereinafter Jeter Il]. See infra
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sponding to "a storm of public protest,"77 the Maryland State
Senate approved a bill "requir[ing] welfare applicants to go
through health screenings and, if suspected of abusing drugs, to
submit to drug testing."78 An applicant referred to drug treat-
ment would be randomly retested, and if he or she refused the
test or tested positive again, the applicant would lose the par-
ent's portion of the welfare grant, with money to the children
paid to a third party.79 Criticism of the proposal centered around
its cost,8° the lack of treatment slots,"' treatments resultant ef-
fectiveness, 8 2 its focus on poor parents,8o and its constitutional
note 246 (providing national statistics on the lack of treatment availability).
77. Sean Scully, Assembly Moving Slowly on Legislation, WASH. TImES, Mar. 15,
1997, at C7.
78. Senate-Approved Bill Would Allow Tax on Tape, Game Rentals; Legislation
Would Require Tests for Welfare Applicants, BALTimORE SUN, Mar. 15, 1997, at 20B.
79. Jeter I, supra note 76, at El. "For a family of three, the loss of the parent's
share of the monthly grant would be $81, reducing the total from $373 to $292 for the
two children? Id.
80. Estimated at over $1.2 million to drug test more than 60,000 welfare applicants
a year, at $18 per drug screening-this cost does not include treatment or challenges to
the veracity of the test. Jeter II, supra note 76. Some estimate that the cost of each test
could rise to $100 apiece in order for the test to withstand a court-challenge. Id. Mary-
land State Senator Ulysses Currie predicts that ten percent of all applicants will test
positive, and five percent will refuse treatment. Ulysses Currie, Maryland Must Test for
Welfare Addicts, WASH. TasS, Feb. 18, 1997, at C2. See supra note 11 (detailing the
costs of drug testing).
81. Robert V. Hess, Editorial, Executive Director of Action for the Homeless, Punish-
ing the Poor Without Helping Them, BALTimoP SUN, Dec. 13, 1996, at A26. Hess noted
that [s]tate spending on treatment has been reduced by 20 percent since 1991, most re-
cently cut by $500,000 in July." Id. The waiting period for a treatment slot in Prince
George's County is two months, and currently only one-third of those needing treatment
in Maryland receive it. Currie, supra note 80, at C2. See also Derrick Z. Jackson,
Mandatory Drug Tests are a Way of Branding the Poor, BOsTON GLOBE, Dec. 13, 1996, at
A35.
82. Treatment in Maryland consists of short-term abstinence-based detoxification
and outpatient treatment. Peter Reuter, A Reform that Should be Rejected: For Users on
Welfare, Drug Tests May Do More Harm Than Good, WASL Posr, Dec. 29, 1996, at C1.
Router correctly observed that in addition to current treatment inadequacy, "faibstinence
is hard to maintain in communities where drugs are commonly used and readily availa-
ble and other sources of satisfaction scarce." Id. Additionally, he noted, "[flew clients of
public drug treatment programs succeed in getting and keeping a job, let alone one that
is good enough to keep them and their children out of poverty.7 Id.
83. Although [rlesearch suggests that up to [twenty] percent of the 4.4 million fam-
ilies receiving welfare benefits nationwide are headed by a parent who has a substance
abuse problem,' Jeter I, supra note 76, Steven Savner, a senior lawyer with the Wash-
ington-based Center for Law and Social Policy maintains that "it is unclear whether
drug use among [the welfare] population is any greater than the population at large." Id.
"National estimates of the fraction of [AFDC] recipients who are drug abusers vary from
4 percent to nearly 30 percent." Reuter, supra note 82. According to the National Insti-
tute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, "'contrary to common characterizations of the
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validity.84 Despite these solid critiques and strident public oppo-
sition to drug testing in Maryland, the state's final welfare re-
form plan requires applicants and recipients to undergo a
mandatory health screen, and to sign a medical release allowing
the department of social services to have access to the results of
any drug test performed in the course of the health screen.sm
The PRA required states to submit welfare reform plans to
the federal government by July 1, 1997. The result of state ef-
forts to restructure and reform welfare delivery systems is a col-
lage of programs with several common themes, but disparate
policy choices with regard to drug users. Running through
nearly all of the state welfare reform laws is the notion of "per-
sonal responsibility,"8 6 and many states have created a contrac-
tual system of welfare delivery which requires applicants and
recipients to enter into a contract with the state.87 The use of
"personal responsibility contracts," and the legislative granting
of complete discretion to local departments of social services to
determine public assistance eligibilitys8 make it difficult to de-
welfare population as having alcohol or drug problems,' its percentages of heavy drink-
ers and drug abusers are similar to the rest of society Jackson, supra note 81. But see
MAKING WELFARE REFoR WORK, supra note 11, at 4. See also supra note 42 (noting that
a[yjou can find the numbers to support whatever thesis about that drug war that you
want to").
84. Maryland Governor Parris Glendening did not endorse the plan, citing possible
constitutional problems. See cf. Zorzi, supra note 76. One of the problems with the plan
is its suspicionless standard-a universal approach to a group of people "Without some
reasonable evidence that someone is using illegal substances Jeter I, supra note 76. See
infra notes 194-96, 222-29, and 240-41 and accompanying text (discussing suspicionless
standards).
85. S.B. 499, ch. 593, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Md. 1997) (Maryland Welfare Innovation Act
of 1997).
86. See, eg., 1997 Ark. Acts 1058, H.B. 1295, 81st Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1997) (creating
Arkansas Personal Responsibility and Public Assistance Reform Act); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 494-184 (1997) (establishing Georgia's "Personal Responsibility Obligation"); S.B. 259,
72d Leg. Assembly, 1997 Reg. Sees. (S.D. 1997) (creating South Dakota personal respon-
sibility act).
87. See, e-g., 1997 Alaska Session Laws 98, H.B. 75, ch. 98 (Personal Responsibility
Plan); S.B. 120, 61st Gen. Assembly, lt Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1997) (Individual Responsibil-
ity Contract); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-184 (1997) (Personal Responsibility Plan); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 43-17-5 (1997) (Personal Responsibility Contract); H.B. 1, 75th Leg., Reg.
Sees. (Tex. 1997) (personal responsibility contract); W.VA. CODE § 9-9-3(i) (1997) (defining
personal responsibility contract). An examination of contract law within a welfare con-
text is beyond the scope of this work. However, this turn towards creating a contractual
relationship between welfare recipients and the state may create additional avenues for
challenge based on contract law which should be explored by welfare recipient advocates.
88. See, ag., H.B. 526, 64th Biennial Sess. (Vt. 1997) (granting broad discretion to
Vermont Department of Social Services); S.B. 259, 72d Leg. Assembly, Reg. Sees. (S.D.
1997) (legislating that discretion in establishing eligibility for public assistance vested
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termine which states will drug test welfare recipients, and what
form that testing will take. Likewise, state plans which impose
strict work requirements may present "drug testing snags" for
current welfare recipients. Wisconsin's plan, what welfare-
watchers call one of the nation's toughest, requires all current
recipients to begin working almost immediately in either the
private sector or in community service jobs.89 Many jobs availa-
ble to men and women moving off of the welfare rolls are low-
wage, low-skill jobs at agencies and businesses which, eager to
take advantage of state subsidies, are increasingly turning to
drug testing to weed out "problem" welfare workers.90
Of those state welfare reform plans that directly address
drug testing, only two states plan to implement a system of
mandatory, suspicionless drug testing-Maryland's health
screen, and Louisiana's plan, which is contained in a larger
piece of legislation conditioning the receipt of "anything of eco-
nomic value from the state" on a negative drug test.91 Several
with Department of Social Services).
89. Jason DeParle, Getting Opal Caples to Work, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug. 24,
1997, at 33.
90. An employment counselor with the Wisconsin Works program (W-2) described a
day at work where she told welfare recipients gathered in her office that 'she ha[d] more
bingo jobs for anyone who [could] pass a drug test." Id. at 36. In response, one woman
asked whether mariuana was a drug. Id. See also WaIaAm JuLus WIlsoN, WHEN WORK
DSAPPEARs: THE WoRD OF THE NEw URBAN POOR 121-22, 132 (1996) (describing the con-
nection between inner-city black male joblessness and the failure of some applicants to
pass drug-screening tests).
91. -LB. 2435 Reg. Sess. (La. 1997) [hereinafter La. H.B. 2435]. House Bill 2435, en-
acted July 1997 requires anyone testing positive for drugs to complete a treatment pro-
gram, paid for by private insurance or by the individual him or herself: LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 1021(E) (West 1997). Refusal to submit to the test, or a second positive test result
would result in the loss of state benefits, including but not limited to: employment ter-
mination, removal from office, loss of a license, loan, scholarship, contract, or public as-
sistance benefit. Id. § 1021(F). However, receipt of public assistance will not be denied
anyone who is participating in treatment. Id. § 460.4(C). Assistance will not be denied if
treatment is unavailable. Id. The Louisiana Legislature's intent is expressed in section
1021(AX1), which reads:
The Legislature does hereby declare that a state of emergency exists in Louisi-
ana as a result of the spiraling increases of abuse of illegal substances by its
citizens. The Legislature further declares that such illegal drug abuse presents
a clear and present danger to the health, welfare, and security of the state, its
citizens, and government. The Legislature acknowledges that the terrible cost
of drug abuse is ultimately paid by all of the state's citizens in the form of pub-
lic monies expended to eradicate, interdict, and destroy such illegal substances,
keep those substances away from our homes, families, schools, and children,
operate a costly and massive criminal justice system for violators, and continue
to attempt to rehabilitate those who have lost the struggle to be free of illegal
drugs. The Legislature further acknowledges that all its citizens eventually pay
1998] DRUG TESTING WELFARE RECIPIENTS 301
states single out certain classes for drug testing.92 Colorado
plans to drug test anyone receiving disability benefits if the pri-
mary cause of the disability is alcohol or substance abuse;93
Minnesota will drug test public assistance applicants and recipi-
ents who have been convicted of drug-related offenses;94 and
Ohio will drug test caretakers of children receiving assistance in
certain counties and pregnant women receiving medical
assistance. 95
A number of states have implemented suspicion-based drug
testing schemes. For example, in New York State applicants for
and recipients of public assistance will be periodically
"screened"96 for substance use, and are also required to submit
the high price of illegal substance abuse by way of decreased productivity in
the work place, and higher costs for goods and services throughout the state's
economic apparatus. The elderly, in particular, are especially affected by
crimes of violence perpetrated by drug abusers who murder and rob to support
their drug habit. Children, especially from lower income families, suffer unnec-
essarily from drug abuse when they go unfed, ill clothed, and without proper
medical treatment because drug abusing adults in the household spend badly
needed money for illegal substances. Many times the drug abusers deny them--
selves proper medical treatment to obtain illegal drugs, often becoming not
only ill, but indigent as well. The Legislature therefore believes that govern-
ment has a compelling interest to insure, protect, and safeguard its citizens
from the scourge of illegal drug abuse, whether in the classroom or the halls of
government.
The Louisiana Legislature provided for a mechanism whereby affected individuals may
challenge the constitutionality of the law prior to its implementation. La. ILB. 2435.
Slated to go into effect in the Summer of 1998, Louisiana's plan is already facing opposi-
tion. Scott Dyer, ACLU Wants to Challenge New La. Drug-Testing Law, THE ADVOCATE
(Baton Rouge, La.), Nov. 17, 1997, at 1A. The ACLU is gearing up to challenge the law
in court, and many in the state are concerned about the law's potential cost, which is es-
timated at over $5 million annually. Marsha Shuler, Foster Eyes Lower Drug-Test Cost,
THE ADvOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Nov. 20, 1997, at liE. One of Louisiana Governor
Mike Foster's ideas for reducing the cost of the plan is to reduce the cost of the rehabili-
tation component of the program. Id.
92. While not a part of welfare reform, Missouri passed a law requiring pregnant
women and newborns to undergo drug testing and specifically abrogating physician-
patient privilege with regard to such tests. The law enables the department of health to
obtain results of such tests. Mo. REv. STAT. § 19L745 (1996). See also 1997 Missouri ILB.
§ 20.690(1) (1997) (providing for drug and alcohol testing for women).
93. CoLO. REV. STAT. PMS. 26-2-111(4XeXI) & (II) (1996).
94. Ch. Law 85, S.F. No. 1, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1997).
95. H.B. 408, § 5107.71, 122d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1997).
96. While collecting urine, blood, or hair samples has been referred to as 'screening'
for drugs, screening more precisely refers to either written or oral "tests' designed to as-
sess whether the respondent either uses, or has a problem using, alcohol or drugs. See
MANKIG WELFARE REFORM WORK, supra note 11, at 47. The Legal Action Center, in its
comprehensive study of issues affecting substance users in welfare reform plans, de-
scribes a number of screening devices, including C.A.G.E., SASSI (Substance Abuse Sub-
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to a drug test if such "screening" indicates that the applicant or
recipient has a substance abuse problem.97
Many states which did not formally provide for drug testing
within their welfare reform plans have chosen to identify appli-
cants and recipients who use drugs by using screening tech-
niques,9 requiring self-declarations, 99 or by relying on reports
from criminal justice personnel. 100
tie Screening Inventory), SMAST (Short Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test), and ASI
(Addiction Severity Index). Id. (citing Martha Morrison Dore et al., Identifying Substance
Abuse in Maltreating Families: A Child Welfare Challenge, 19 CmL ABusE & NEGLECT
531 (1995); J.A. Ewing Detecting Alcoholism: The CAGE Questionnaire, 252 JAMA 1905
(1971)). Criticism of these screening devices centers around their reliability, the sanc-
tions or requirements imposed on test-takers who are assessed as having substance
abuse problems, and the fact that such questionnaires violate the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act. See infra Section I.D., note 154 and accompanying text.
97. S.B. 5788, 220th Annual Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997) (amending N.Y. Soc. Ser. L.
§ 132 by adding subdivision 4). The state's new "Office of Temporary and Disability As-
sistance" adopted accompanying regulations on September 25, 1997, N.Y. Comp. CODES R.
& REGs. tit. 18, § 351.2 (1997), and drug screening went into effect in November 1997.
See also 305 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 5 § 4-19 (West 1993); H.B. 1080, 90th Gen. Assembly,
Reg. Sess. (l. 1997) (providing for suspicion-based testing for caretaker/relatives); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 39-7, 113(a) (1996) (pilot program for suspicion-based drug testing); 62 PA.
CoNs. STAT. § 405.3(a)(7) (1997) (suspicion-based drug testing); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-5-
1190 (1996) amended by 1997 S.C. Acts 133, H.B. 3650, (S.C. 1997), R. 235 (S.C. 1997)
(suspicion-based drug testing). See also infra Appendix I (detailing state-by-state drug
testing plans).
New York's law provides that
when the screening process indicates that there is reason to believe that an ap-
plicant or recipient is abusing or dependent on alcohol or drugs, the social ser-
vices district shall require a formal alcohol or substance abuse assessment,
which may include drug testing, to be performed by an alcohol and/or sub-
stance abuse professional credentialed by the Office of Alcohol and Substance
Abuse Services. The assessment may be performed directly by the District or
pursuant to contract with the District.
S.B. 5788 pt. B § 23 (to be codified at N.Y. Soc. Ser. L. § 132(4)(B)).
In efforts to implement regulations pursuant to this law before it had even been
passed, the New York State Department of Social Services issued a draft Administrative
Directive which set forth the method by which drug testing would be accomplished. The
draft read, in part, that "gender appropriate staff must 'accompany' the applicant/recipi-
ent and 'observe' the collection of the urine sample to preclude substitution or alteration
of the sample .... Once the sample has been collected procedures must exist to ensure
the integrity of handling, processing, and testing the sample." Greater Upstate Law Pro-
ject, Inc., Coalition for the Homeless, DSS Takes Steps to Implement Pataki Welfare
Plan; Advocates Charge They Jumped the Gun, Press Release, May 19, 1997 (on file with
the Buffalo Law Review) (quoting draft ADM on Governor's proposed Article XVII Safety
Net Program).
98. See MAKING WELFARE REFoRm WORK, supra note 11, at 36, 79-81. See also supra
note 96.
99. See MAKING WELFARE REFORm WORK, supra note 11, at 36, 79-81.
100. See S.B. 841 1997 Sess. (Va. 1996) (authorizing parole and probation officers to
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HI. CHALLENGING THE LAW
A challenge to any state plan to condition the receipt of wel-
fare on a drug test will inevitably be based in part on the pri-
vacy protections in the Fourth Amendment's proscription of un-
reasonable searches and seizures. 1 1 Other constitutional bases
are the due process protections and the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The challenge could also be stat-
utory, based on the protections offered by the Americans with
Disabilities Act, or doctrinal, based on the doctrine of Unconsti-
tutional Conditions. Additionally, state constitutions may' pro-
vide greater protections to welfare recipients than the federal
constitution.
A. State Constitutional Challenge
State constitutions may afford more protection to welfare
recipients in the wake of welfare reform than any protections
embodied in the federal constitution. 10 2 Notwithstanding the fed-
eral and state governments' intent to withdraw any entitlement
to welfare, 03 twenty-two state constitutions include some provi-
sion for the care of the needy, and twelve state constitutions
contain a specific obligation of the state to care for the needy.'04
New York, for example, is uniquely situated vis-d-vis the
changes states are required to make to their public assistance
programs pursuant to the PRA. Its constitution contains a provi-
notify department of social services when persons under their supervision have tested
positive for drugs twice); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-105.8 (Michie 1997) (requiring that upon
notification from parole or probation officer of recipient's two failed drug tests, aid ren-
dered as vendor payments to third-party payees). See also H.B. 526, 64th Biennial Sess.,
§ 266 (Vt. 1997) (authorizing department of social services to receive conviction records
for all current recipients).
101. For a brief review of constitutional challenges to drug testing in an employ-
ment context, see Kenneth C. Haas, Drug Testing and the Constitution, in HANDBOOK OF
DRUG CONTROL, supra note 21, at 245-66.
102. See Daan Braveman, Children, Poverty, and State Constitutions, 38 EMORY W.
577 (1989). Braveman identifies four distinct reasons that state constitutions afford a
greater breadth of protection to welfare recipients: more generous textual provisions,
state common law traditions, the political accountability of the state court judiciary, and
the lack of federalism constraints on state courts. Id. at 603-13. See also Robert F. Wil-
liams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 Tsx L. REv. 1195 (1985);
David Schuman, The Right to 'Equal Privileges and Immunities.• A States Version of
"Equal Protection," 13 VT. L REV. 221 (1985) (noting that 15 states have equal privileges
and immunities clauses).
103. See, eg., MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-4-231(3X1) (1997) (stating that "[t]his part may
not be interpreted to entitle any individual or family to assistance).
104. Bravenan, supra note 102, at 595-96 & nn.90-95.
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sion mandating that the state provide some level of assistance
to the poor.10 5 Although there have been numerous calls to
amend the Constitution and delete the guarantee of aid to the
poor,106 it is likely that Article 17 will serve as a bar to some of
the more egregious and draconian welfare reform measures. 107
105. Article XVII of the New York State Constitution reads: The aid, care and sup-
port of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state ... in such a
manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine." N.Y.
CoNsT. art. XVII. New York courts have, since 1977, recognized that Article XVH man-
dates aid to the needy. Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.E.2d 449, 451 (1977) ("In New York State,
the provision for assistance to the needy is not a matter of legislative grace; rather, it is
specifically mandated by [Article 17] of our Constitution."). While New York courts have
debated the extent to which the courts can dictate the manner in which the legislature
apportions benefits to the needy, it is undisputed that a complete denial of aid to the
needy is unconstitutional Id. at 452. Cf Barie v. Levine, 357 N.E.2d 349, 352 (1976) (up-
holding temporary suspension of aid to those unjustifiably refusing employment as a
choice of "manner"). See Christine Robitscher Ladden, Note, A Right to Shelter for the
Homeless in New York State, 61 N.Y.U. L, REv. 272, 275-81 (1986) (discussing New York's
judicial interpretation of Article 17).
106. See, eg., John J. Marchi, New York's Welfare Meltdown, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 12,
1996, at A15 (editorial by Republican state senator calling for an amendment to the N.Y.
Constitution altering Article 17 to read that the state "may provide" for the needy in
place of "shall provide"); Jerry Gray, Quit Complaining About Bill, Rep. Kasich Tells
Governors, N.Y. T=zS, Aug. 2, 1996, at A17 (Ohio Republican suggests that states re-
quired to care for the needy per constitutional mandate "should consider changing their
laws"). Article XIX, § 2 of the New York Constitution requires the state's voters to de-
cided, every 20 years, whether to hold a constitutional convention. See Ladden, supra
note 105, at 285-96 (describing process to amend N.Y. Constitution and reviewing legis-
lative history of Art. XVII). New Yorkers defeated the ballot measure calling for a consti-
tutional convention in the November 1997 elections. Richard Perez-Pena, The 1997 Elec-
tions: Ballot Question; Voters Reject Constitutional Convention, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1997,
at B1.
107. The New York Civil Liberties Union stood poised to bring a constitutional chal-
lenge to mandatory, suspicionless drug testing and to a bar on convicted felon receipt of
welfare had such proposals passed in New York State. Harvy Lipman, Pataki's Welfare
Proposal Criticized, TmIES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Mar. 21, 1997, at B2. Provisions in the
PRA forbidding states from providing any aid whatsoever to illegal aliens, and imposing
heavy restrictions on aid to certain types of legal immigrants, are the provisions most
likely to be in conflict with Section 17. Accordingly, New York City Mayor Rudolph Giu-
liani, the Center for Constitutional Rights, the N.Y. Legal Aid Society, and the American
Civil Liberties Union for Northern California filed class-action lawsuits in New York and
San Francisco on March 26, 1997, challenging the constitutionality of the new laws af-
fecting legal immigrants. See David Firestone, Giuliani Suit to Contest Cutoff of US.
Benefits to Immigrants, N.Y. Tms, Mar. 26, 1997, at B3. The suits base their challenge
on the due process clause. Id. A preliminary injunction was granted on March 31, 1997,
enjoining states from putting into effect April 1 cuts in benefits. Id. For a preliminary
analysis of the likely success of that suit, see Virginia Ellis & Patrick J. McDonnell,
Lawsuits Target US. Cuts in Aid for Immigrants, LA Tnas, Mar. 27, 1997, at A3. Re-
cently struck down as per Section 17 was a law that, by imposing a six-month waiting
period, effectively denied benefits to a class of primarily single adults who move to New
York from other states. See Ben Dobbin, Law Restricting Home Relief Aid struck Down,
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New York courts have refused to require that the legislature
provide sufficient benefits for the poor, as have many other state
courts where aid to the needy is a constitutional guarantee.
State courts are generally
[r]eluctan[t to set welfare levels, a function better performed by the leg-
islature. [This] causes. court[s] to draw an artificially bright line: the
state constitution precludes a complete denial of benefits to the needy,
but grants the legislature virtually complete discretion to determine the
means for providing aid, the amount of the aid, and the definition of who
is needy.108
Montana courts have gone further by showing a willingness
to examine the sufficiency of public assistance benefits. 10 9 In
Butte Community Union v. Harris, the Montana Supreme Court
struck down a state plan which imposed time limits and other
efforts to cut back on public assistance, holding that
[t]he State may legitimately limit its expenditures for public assistance,
public education or any other program even-handedly applied. It may not
limit its expenditures by the expedient of eliminating classes of eligible
individuals from public assistance without regard to their constitution-
ally grounded right to society's aid when needed, through misfortune, for
the basic necessities of life.110
The Court in Butte Community Union found that a determina-
tion of the reasonableness of a state plan was not simply a mat-
ter of legislative discretion, but rather a question of fact to be
addressed by the court. The strength of this holding will be im-
portant to a determination of whether the Montana legislature
may deny public assistance to anyone convicted of a drug-
related felony."'
Alaska's Ravin v. State"2 provides another example of the
greater protections afforded under. state constitutions. In Ravin,
BuFF. NEws, Oct. 22, 1996.
108. See Braveman, supra note 102, at 599.
109. Id. at 602 (citing Butte Community Union v. Harris, 745 P.2d 1128 (Mont.
1987)).
110. Id. at 601.
111. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-4-231(3)(1) (1997); See infra Appendix II. Montana is
one of the states which has attempted to statutorily abrogate entitlement to welfare.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-4-231(5).
112. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975). A January 30, 1998, Hawai'ian Supreme Court de-
cision interpreting article I, section 6 of the Hawai'i Constitution let Ravin stand, but
limited its holding to private possession and use of marijuana in the home. Hawai'i v.
Ma~lan, 950 P.2d 178 (Haw. 1998) (holding that the Hawai'ian Constitution's privacy pro-
tections do not encompass a right to possess and use marijuana for recreational pur-
poses in a public parking lot).
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the court decided a case involving marijuana possession, holding
that "citizens of Alaska have a right to privacy under the state
constitution," and "that right would encompass the possession
and [use of] ... marijuana in a personal, non-commercial con-
text in the home."113 An expanded privacy right under the
Alaska constitution will animate a challenge to sanctions levied
under the terms of the Alaska Temporary Assistance Program's
"contract system,"11 4 and to the provision in Alaska's welfare re-
form which renders convicted drug felons ineligible for food
stamps.115
B. Federal Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment protection of due process in the
context of welfare reached its apogee with the Supreme Court's
decision in Goldberg v. Kelly,1 6 which established a federal enti-
tlement to welfare. Goldberg applied a two-part test which
asked: (1) does due process apply, that is, is the right a property
interest, and if so, is there. a government actor threatening to
take it away? If due process does apply, (2) what process is due?
While the rhetoric surrounding welfare reform suggests that
public assistance will no longer be a federal entitlement,1 7 and
some states have codified an intent to abrogate state entitle-
ment,"8 the existence of a "right" or entitlement to welfare will
still depend on whether an applicant or recipient can show a
property interest in such benefits. Such a property interest or
right may be found in state constitutional law, 19 state statutes
113. Braveman, supra note 102, at 605 (citing to Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504).
114. See ATAP Family Self-Sufficiency Plan, Oct. 7, 1997, <http:ll
health.hss.state.ak.us/htmlstufpubassis/FSSP.htm> (on file with the Buffalo Law Re-
view); see also supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing contract system of wel-
fare delivery).
115. See MAKING WELFARE REFORm WoRK, supra note 11; see also infra Appendix II,
n.1.
116. 397 US. 254 (1970).
117. The "block grant" approach taken by federal welfare reform removes the enti-
tlement to public assistance for anyone who meets the program's eligibility require-
ments. Funding for programs under the block grant approach does not increase as de-
-and for assistance grows. See Susan V. Demers, The Failures of Litigation as a Tool for
the Development of Social Welfare Policy, 22 FORDHAM URB. UJ. 1009, 1010 n.15 (1995).
118. See, eg., 1997 Montana Laws 486.
119. See N.Y. CoNsr. art. XVII (guaranteeing aid to the needy). See supra notes 102-
06 and accompanying text. The New York Court of Appeals struck down
a state law which denied welfare benefits to anyone under 21 not living with a
parent or relative unless that young person sued his or her parents for support
... [ruling] that the state can't use the denial of public assistance as a tool to
change behavior which is not related to whether or not someone is needy.
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and regulations, or in the practices adopted by the state.20
Once a right to a specific benefit is established, the second
prong of a due process analysis looks to the process that is re-
quired. State plans have been careful to include both notifica-
tion and appeals processes in testing schemes, provisions which
usually result in a determination of adequate due process. How-
ever, state plans which require mandatory drug testing or treat-
ment upon the determination of a social services official can be
challenged by looking at the process by which a social services
official makes that determination and the qualifications of the
official.' 2'
Lipman, supra note 107, at B2 (citing Tucker, 43 N.Y.2d at 9).
120. See, e.g., McCain v. Koch, 484 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (While
"[n]either the Constitution nor the [N.Y.] Social Services Law... provide that emer-
gency shelter be given to the needy in explicit terms," once the state has undertaken to
provide emergency shelter, that shelter must meet "reasonable minimum standards.").
Due Process challenges in New York State are rarely resolved at trial. See Demers,
supra note 117, at 1015 n.42 (noting that four cases have gone to full trial on the merits:
Mixon v. Grinker, 595 N.Y.S.2d 876 (Sup. Ct. 1993); Jiggetts v. Grinker, 553 N.E.2d 570
(N.Y. 1990); Dinins v. Perales, Index No. 1457/82 (Sup. Ct. Alb. Co. 1982); Anderson v.
Perales, 91 Civ. No. 1294 (N.D.N.Y. 1991)). Rather, they usually result in court-
monitored settlements. See, e.g., Consent Decree, Callahan v. Carey, Index No. 42582/79
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. Aug. 1981); Stipulation of Settlement, Wilder v. Bernstein, 78 Civ. 957
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1985); Stipulation and Order, McCain v. Koch, Index No. 41023/83
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. June 1, 1990).
121. The concern over the possibility of false positives and the sanctions that could
be imposed as a result are usually addressed by pointing to the adequacy of post-test ap-
peals processes, which are addressed as due process issues. As one expert in addiction
and alcohol studies noted, "[b]ecause detection limits are so low in most lab analyses,
even second-hand exposure can produce a positive." Correspondence with Dr. Frederick
Rotgers, Center for Alcohol Studies, Rutgers University, Director, Program for Addiction
Consultation and Treatment at St. Peter's Medical Center (Jan. 11, 1997) (on file with
the Buffalo Law Review). Rotgers described a situation in which a dentist who was up
for review before a state licensing board took a drug test and tested positive for cocaine,
which he disavowed ever using. What became apparent in the subsequent hearing was
that the dentist's girlfriend,
unbeknown'st to him, had snorted cocaine several times during an evening they
spent together and rubbed the residue on her gums (a common practice). They
then engaged in heavy petting and oral sex. [The n]ext day he gave a urine
specimen which was positive. In his hearing before the Board of Dentistry, Dr.
John Morgan, professor of pharmacology at CUNY Medical School, testified
that while the typical line of coke contains 30-50 mg [of the drug] (which is
about the threshold range to produce a clear psychoactive effect--a "high")
studies have been done in which volunteers who drank coca tea which delivers
2-4 mg. of cocaine per cup (enough to give the "kick" of a strong cup of coffee or
a bottle of 'jolt" cola) tested positive [i]n the usual analyses with levels of co-
caine more than 100 times the detection limit!
Id. False positives are common for a number of reasons in urine and blood testing, and
may implicate an associational right under the First Amendment, as well. The argument
would center around an individual's right to associate with drug users and his or her in-
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Despite welfare reform rhetoric, Goldberg remains good law
and will continue to govern the requirements of due process, en-
suring the right to a fair hearing prior to termination of bene-
fits.m Notwithstanding statutory language to the contrary, the
severity of denying subsistence benefits to a class of citizens un-
able to provide for their own food and shelter is undeniable. Jus-
tice Brennan's recognition of the implications of denial of public
assistance remains persuasive:
[Tihe crucial factor in this context-a factor not present in the case of
the blacklisted government contractor, the discharged government em-
ployee ... or virtually anyone else whose governmental entitlements are
ended-is that termination of aid... may deprive an eligible recipient of
the very means by which to live while he waits.m
ability to do so for fear of testing positive for drugs. Perhaps an amusing example of this
idea is the case of the Canadian gold-medal snowboarder, Ross Rebagliati. Rebagliati ap-
pealed a decision of the International Olympic Committee stripping him of his gold
medal in the 1998 Games in Nagano, Japan after he tested positive for marijuana in a
post-race drug test. Maintaining that he tested positive due to second-hand smoke from
friends at a send-off party before the Games, Rebagliati stated: "Pm not going to change
my friends [although] I might have to wear a gas mask around them from now on." Ca-
nadian Vows to Don Gas Mask Near Dope-Smoking Friends, 1998 AAP Information Ser-
vices, Feb. 13, 1998, available in LEXIS Curnws File.
Several commentators have examined the possibility of imposing tort liability on
laboratories for false positives. Manfield, supra note 4; Scott P. Callahan, Note, 38 S.
TMx L REV. 823 (1997) (analyzing SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Doe, 903 S.W.2d 347
(Tex. 1995) which held that there is "no duty to warn" that certain substances can cause
false positives). See also Santiago v. Greyhound Bus Lines, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 144
(N.D.N.Y. 1997).
Drug testing through hair samples, most frequently by the use of Radioimmunoas.
say of hair (RIAH), poses unique problems for persons of African descent. Studies have
shown a higher degree of false positives for drugs found in the hair samples of persons
of African descent. See KENT HOLTORF, UR-in TROUBLE 80-82 (1997). The difference in
detection is attributable to the amount of melanin in the hair of different ethnic groups
and meanin's ability to bind drugs. Id. at 81. Holtorf cites studies published in the Jour-
nal of Analytical Toxicology and the Journal of Forensic Science, and quotes an official
from the National Institute on Drug Abuse: "Differences greater than 50 fold were ob-
served in cocaine binding to Africoid male hair compared with blonde, female caucasoid
hair specimens: Id. at 80. For a detailed bibliography of hair testing, see Arthur McBay,
Hair Drug Testing Bibliography, 1 INT'L J. OF DRUG TESTMnG (Univ. of S. Fla. at St. Pe-
tersburg) (Fall 1996), Feb. 24, 1998, <http'/www.big.stpt.usfedu/-joumal/mcbay2.html>
(on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
122. But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?,
96 COLUM. L. REv. 1973 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court is retreating from
Goldberg and its progeny).
123. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US. 254, 264 (1970) (emphasis in original).
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C. Federal Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that state govern-
ments shall not deny any person equal protection of the laws.
Preliminary to determination of an equal protection violation is
a "finding of governmental action undertaken with an intent to
discriminate against a particular individual or class of individu-
als&" Classifications and separations of people are subject to
scrutiny, but in varying degrees. The Supreme Court has devel-
oped three levels of judicial review for deciding equal protection
claims: strict scrutiny,25 rational basis review,2a and an inter-
mediate level of review. When a "suspect" class-one based on
race or ethnic heritage'2 7-is treated differently in the eyes of
the law, (that is, classified for the purposes of fines, punish-
ment, or privileges), the differential treatment is presumptively
invalid and the court looks at the classification with strict scru-
tiny. Strict scrutiny is also applied when the classification in-
volves a fundamental right.ms Strict scrutiny requires that the
state show that its classification serves a "compelling state in-
terest." Quasi-suspect status is afforded classifications based on
gender and illegitimacy and invokes intermediate scrutiny.2 9
Under this intermediate level of scrutiny, the state must show
that the "classifications by gender must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives."130
Traditionally, courts have refused to recognize poverty or
124. Joyce v. San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 858 (1994) (citing Personnel Adm'r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 US. 256, 271-72 (1979)).
125. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
126. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
127. Only race and ethnic heritage have been definitively recognized as suspect
classifications. See Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 US. 483, 493 (1954); Loving v. Virginia,
388 US. 1, 11 (1967); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); Sugarman v. Dou-
gall, 413 U.S. 634, 646-48 (1973).
128. Fundamental rights include those specifically guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,
such as freedom of speech, freedom of interstate migration, and, most important to the
instant analysis, the right to be free from unreasonable searches, and those rights not
mentioned in the Constitution, but presumably inherent. See John Hart Ely, Foreword:
On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARv. L Rav. 5 (1978).
129. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (indicating that sex should
not be part of the "narrowly limited group of classifications which are inherently sus-
pect.") (Powell, J., concurring); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (gender); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimacy); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109 (1973) ("illegitimate" children) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Ply-
ler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (children of illegal immigrants).
130. Craig, 429 US. at 197.
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any economic-class-based distinction as suspect, 13 1 including
homelessness. 132 However, a class of welfare recipients is a "dis-
favored" class, not because of its economic status vis-d-vis the
"working" population, but because of the stigma that attaches to
the status of welfare recipient.13 The status of "homelessness"
can also be considered disfavored for its lack of political power-
someone without an address has no identifiable geographic rep-
resentative in the government.134
131. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 487 U.S. 450 (1988) ("We have previously
rejected the suggestion that statutes having different effects on the wealthy and the poor
should on that account alone be subjected to strict equal protection scrutiny.") (citing
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1980) (poverty standing alone not a suspect clas-
sification)); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 US. 656,
660 (1973); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 US. 56 (1972); but see Opinion of Justices, 624 So.2d
107 (Ala. 1993); Pinto v. Alabama Coalition for Equity, 662 So.2d 894 (Ala. 1995); Ex
parte James, 1997 Ala. LEXIS 16 (Ala. Jan. 10, 1997) (dealing with inequitable school
fiuding in areas with different tax bases, ordering remedial measures to equalize educa-
tional resources based on equal protection clause in Alabama Constitution). See Holly
Kurtz, School Funding Equation Hard to Solve, MONTGOMERY ADvERsTER, Jan. 15, 1997,
at A14 (discussing court order in Ex parte James). See also Deborah C. Malamud, Class-
Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEs. L. REV. 1847 (1996). Malamud
argues that there is a trend towards class-based affirmative action in lieu of politically
precarious race-based affirmative action, and that the Supreme Court's decision in
Adarand Const., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) bolsters what has become a "conserva-
tive war cry.! Malamud, supra, at 1847. Malamud noted the "failed efforts of advocates
of welfare rights to achieve recognition of the poor as a 'suspect class' under the Equal
Protection Clause," but maintained that the decision in Adarand is a step towards that
recognition. Id. at 1848 n.6.
132. D'Aguanno v. Gallagher, 50 F.3d 877, 879 n.2 (11th Cir. 1995); Kreimer v. Bu-
reau of Police for Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1269 n.36 (3d Cir. 1992); Davison
v. City of Tuscon, 924 F. Supp. 989, 993 (D.C. Ariz. 1996). See generally Wes Daniels,
"Derelicts," Recurring Misfortune, Economic Hard Times and Lifestyle Choices: Judicial
Images of Homeless Litigants and Implications for Legal Advocates, 45 BuFF. L. REV. 687
(1997) (discussing treatment of the rights of the homeless to subsistence benefits and
housing).
133. See, eg., Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 393 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994), superseded by 872 P.2d 559 (1994), revd 892 P.2d 1145 (1995); Church v. Hunts-
ville, Civ. A. No. 93-C-1239-S, 1993 WL 646401 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 23, 1993); Pottinger v.
Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1578 (1992). The Pottinger court noted that it was
not entirely convinced that homelessness as a class has none of [the] "tradi-
tional indicia of suspectness." It can be argued that the homeless are saddled
with such disabilities, or have been subjected to a history of unequal treatment
or are so politically powerless that extraordinary protection of the homeless as
a class is warranted.
Id. However, the court found it unnecessary to make that determination and granted the
homeless plaintiffs' motion for an injunction against the city based on the city's infringe-
ment of their right to travel. Id. But see Joyce v. San Francisco, 846 F Supp. 843, 857
(1994) ("homelessness" not a status because "status cannot be defined as a function of
the discretionary acts of others").
134. Some have called this the "State of Homelessness" argument. See Trial Tran-
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To garner status as a "disfavored class," a group must show
that it has: "(1) ... suffered some moderate discriminatory
treatment and is politically powerless, (2) the classification ste-
reotypes in a fashion that inaccurately portrays the group's abil-
ities, or (3) the group possesses a personal trait over which it
has no control."' 5 Even if a court were to view a class of welfare
recipients as a "disfavored class," increased scrutiny does not en-
sure victory, it just makes it more difficult for the government
to prove that its interests supersede those of the recipient. 136
Plyler v. Doe is instructive in this context insofar as it ex-
tends a "disfavored class" status, thereby applying a strict scru-
tiny analysis, on a group of children of illegal immigrants. 137 In
Plyler, the Court invalidated a plan to deny public education to
the children of illegal immigrants. The Court based its decision
on the fact that the children involved were members of an un-
derclass and that they were the innocent victims of their par-
ents' illegal conduct.138 Plyler arguably stands as the only time
the Court has granted disfavored class status to a group based
on its position in society,139 and its holding bolsters an argument
script, United States v. Carey, Crim. No. M-9066-96 (Jan. 3, 1997) (on file with the Dis-
trict of Columbia Superior Court). Representative John Lewis (D-GA) introduced H.R.
74, Voting Rights of Homeless Citizens Act of 1997, on Jan. 7, 1997. The Act would "en-
able the homeless... to vote. The bill would remove the legal and admini trative barri-
ers that inhibit them from exercising this right .... Mn many states, the homeless are
left out and left behind." 143 CONG. REC. E37 (remarks of Rep. John Lewis).
135. Guthrie, supra note 14, at 594 n.111 (citing LAuRENcE TmB, AmFmcAN CONSTI-
TuTnONAL LAw, § 16-33 (1988)).
136. Likewise, rationality review does not dictate a holding in favor of the govern-
ment action. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (striking down a Colorado Con-
stitutional amendment denying protected class status to gay, lesbian, and bisexual per-
sons on rational basis review).
137. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). In addition, the Court's action flew in the face of strong
anti-immigrant rhetoric, in much the same way that a successful challenge to a drug
testing scheme might fly in the face of anti-drug rhetoric. The force of Plyler was diluted
in a later case in which the Court noted that the Plyler holding was restricted to the
"unique circumstances" that gave rise to a "unique confluence of theories and rationales."
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988) (quoting Plyler, 457 US. at
239, 243); See also Philadelphia Police & Fire Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 874 F.2d 156,
165 (3d Cir. 1989) (rejecting district court's application of Plyler to justify heightened
scrutiny in denial of access to education); Catlin v. Sobol, 881 F. Supp. 789 (N.D.N.Y.
1995) (criticizing Plyler).
138. Applying strict scrutiny based on the children's disfavored class status was a
stretch, but ultimately the Court!s sympathy for the children and the importance of edu-
cation may have had more force than an argument about "classification."
139. Though some argue that the children's status as "illegal aliens" was a condition
of birth, not situational. See, ag., Audra Behne, Balancing the Adoption 7iangle: the
State, the Adoptive Parents and the Birth Parents-Where Does the Adoptee Fit In?, 15 IN
THE Pun. INT. 49 (1997). Cf San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109
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against any plan which denies assistance to children based on
the acts of their parents. While states have been careful to carve
out the sanctions, preserving the children's benefits via payment
to a third party or restricting the sanction to a denial of cash
benefits, the impact on a child in a family with one sanctioned
member will be severe. The entire family will be forced to "live
on less."14°
United States v. Armstrong' dealt a blow to equal protec-
tion claims. Although the case dealt directly with a selective
prosecution challenge, it has larger implications for how the
Court classifies individuals as "similarly situated." In Arm-
strong, five black men challenged their prosecution on the basis
that they were selectively prosecuted for "crack" cocaine charges
by introducing evidence that nearly one hundred percent of all
crack prosecutions in their jurisdiction, which carry a heavier
sentence than those levied for offenses involving powder co-
caine, 42 were of black men.14 The plaintiffs in that case were
merely asking for the prosecution to turn over certain docu-
ments to help them demonstrate their "selective prosecution"
claim. In response, the Court held that "[flor a defendant to be
entitled to discovery on a claim that he was singled out for pros-
ecution on the basis of his race, he must make a threshold
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[Illegitimacy has long been stigmatized by our society.
Hence, discrimination on the basis of birth-particularly when it affects innocent chil-
dren-warrants special judicial consideration.").
140. See MAKING WELFARE REFoRM WORK, supra note 11, at 54; see also Punishment
of Drug Offenders, supra note 12, at 988 n.11.
141. 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996); see also United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768 (E.D.
Mo.) (crack sentence unconstitutional on equal protection grounds), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709
(8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995).
142. The so-called "crack statute," 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (1993), mandates a pen-
alty 100 times more harsh for possessors of crack than possessors of powder cocaine. Ja-
son A. Gillmer, Note, United States v. Clary. Equal Protection and the Crack Statute, 45
AM. U. L. REV. 497, 501 (1995) (comprehensive analysis of racial discrimination in drug
sentencing, the crack statute, and equal protection).
Section 841(bX1XAXiii) provides that any person convicted of possession with
intent to distribute '50 grams or more of a mixture or substance... which con-
tains [crack]' shall be sentenced to no less than 10 years in prison. The same
penalty, under 21 US.C. 841(bX1XAXiiXII) is imposed on a person possessing
5000 grams or more of cocaine powder.
Id. at 501 n.18. See also Troy Duster, Pattern, Purpose, and Race in the Drug War: The
Crisis of Credibility in Criminal Justice, in CRACK IN AMERICA, supra note 23, at 260. See
also supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing crack sentencing disparity).
143. '[Nlationally, close to ninety percent of the defendants convicted for federal
crack violations have been black, while only about four percent have been white."
Gillmer, supra note 142, at 501 (citing studies). See also Duster, supra note 142, at 265-
66.
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showing that the Government declined to prosecute similarly
situated suspects of other races."14 In that case, the Court de-
fined "similarly situated" narrowly by requiring a showing that
the government declined to prosecute white men for similar
crack cocaine offenses. For a welfare recipient to challenge a
drug testing scheme based on equal protection, the recipient
would have to show that he or she is similarly situated to a per-
son not receiving public assistance. Armstrong indicates that the
Court chose a narrow view of what makes a group of people
similarly situated.
Ultimately, an equal protection claim will focus on whether
the drug testing plan exposes only the poor to the indignities of
the test.14 A federal claim of an equal protection violation would
have to defeat the threshold argument that receipt of cash assis-
tance is no longer an entitlement. If the poor do not want to
face such an indignity, they can choose to eschew the benefit.
Documentary and testimonial evidence will demonstrate that
the argument is not so simple. Cash benefits are not a simple
choice since they constitute a means of subsistence. Basing a
challenge on a state-created entitlement to public assistance is
more likely to be successful."4
D. Statutory Challenge
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)' 47 pro-
vides broad protections for individuals with disabilities. It pro-
hibits "discriminat[ion] against a qualified individual with a dis-
ability because of the disability of such individual.f 14 The term
"qualified individual with a disability," however, does "not in-
clude [an individual] who is currently engaging in the illegal use
of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such
use." 49 The ADA does protect those who either participate in or
have successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation
program and are no longer engaging in illegal drug use.5 0
The ADA allows for the "adopt[ion] or administ[ration of]
reasonable policies or procedures, including but not limited to
144. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1482.
145. This claim can be undercut by the burgeoning number of private employers
who require prospective employees to undergo drug testing. See supra notes 15-19 (prev-
alence of drug testing.in the private sector).
146. See supra Part H.
147. 42 US.C. § 12101 et seq. (1994).
148. Id. § 12112(a).
149. Id. § 12114(a).
150. Id. § 12114(b).
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drug testing,"'51 and it does not prohibit requiring those with a
history of addiction to "submit to more frequent testing than
other employees" 52 There are several possible ways to utilize
the protections of the ADA in this context. With regard to disclo-
sure of drug use, several recent cases have dealt with whether
an employer can require an employee to disclose information
about medication they are currently taking.'5 3 In 1995 a San
Francisco District Court Judge found that subjecting welfare re-
cipients to a written drug screen violated the ADA.15 4
Although the protections of the ADA do not extend to cur-
rent users of illegal drugs, recent court decisions widen the door
for such users.1 5 Some have suggested that the provisions in the
PRA may themselves contradict the ADA.156 Because the ADA is
relatively new legislation, and caselaw is surprisingly scant,
there are wide discrepancies about the breadth of its protection
in this area. 5 7
151. Id.
152. See Buckley v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., No. 96-9039, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27631, at *10-11 (2d Cir. Oct. 8, 1997).
153. See, eg., Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, 920 F. Supp. 1153 (D.
Colo. 1996), modified 124 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1997).
154. See Recent Drug Testing News, Mar. 10, 1997, <http'//www.passdrugs.corn
drugtestinfo.html> (spot: san) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review) (court in Hunsaker
v. County of Contra Costa held that use of SASSI drug screening assessment device vio-
lated ADA); see also Hunsaker v. County of Contra Costa, No. C-95-1082 mmc, 1997
Westlaw 835164 (N.D. CaL July 31, 1997) (order granting permanent injunctive relief en-
joining county from using SASSI results as a basis for further evaluation).
155. See, eg., McDaniel v. Mississippi Baptist Medical Center, 869 F. Supp. 445
(S.D. Miss. 1994) ("safe harbor" created by ADA § 12114(b) restores protection to drug
users who stop engaging in illegal drug use or enter or complete drug rehabilitation);
Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 711
(1996) (questioning determination of "recent use," considering drug-related misconduct
as standard); Baustian v. Louisiana, 910 F. Supp. 274 (E.D. La. 1995) (seven weeks clean
not long enough to overcome "current use"); Starr v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., Appeal No. C-
950217, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5778 (Hamilton Co., Ohio Dec. 29, 1995) (23 days not
long enough).
156. See Booth, supra note 73.
157. One attorney with the National Persons with Disabilities Law Center in At-
lanta, Georgia, has argued for innovative uses of the ADA to broaden its protections.
Stephen G. Weizenecker, Federal Statutes and Harm Reduction: Methods 7b Protect
Drug Users From Unlawful Discrimination, Presentation at The First National Harm
Reduction Conference in Oakland, California (Sept. 19, 1996) (transcript available from
the Harm Reduction Coalition). But see Jonathan R. Mook & Erin E. Powell, Substance
Abuse and the ADA- What Every Employer Should Know, EMPLOyEE RELATIONS LJ., Au-
tumn 1996, at 57.
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E. Unconstitutional Conditions
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that the
government cannot condition the receipt of a benefit on the re-
linquishment of a constitutional right.1 8 The Supreme Court
has reaffirmed this doctrine time and again in a line of cases
since 1931,1 9 broken only by Wyman v. James,16 a 1971 case in
which tie Court rejected a challenge, similar to the one sug-
gested here, to a welfare regulation. The Wyman Court ruled
against a welfare recipient who argued that the doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions barred the state's practice of condition-
ing her receipt of welfare on her submission to home visits by a
caseworker. The Court rejected her Fourth Amendment-based
challenge holding that "there [was] no search involved in th[e]
case; that even if there were a search, it would not be unreason-
able; and that even if [it] were an unreasonable search, a wel-
fare recipient waives her right to object by accepting benefits" 161
Holding that home visits were not "searches" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because they were not born
of criminal suspicion, nor did they result in criminal prosecu-
tion,1 62 the Court pointed to several factors which would negate
158. See, eg., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Guthrie provided a compre-
hensive analysis of the likely success of an argument based on the doctrine of unconsti-
tutional conditions. See Guthrie, supra note 14, at 598-602. Justice Sutherland defined
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in 1931 as follows: 'the right to continue the
exercise of a privilege granted by the state cannot be made to depend upon the grantee's
submission to a condition prescribed by the state which is hostile to the provisions of the
federal Constitution." United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 282 US. 311, 328-
29 (1931).
159. See, eg., Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 282 US. at 311; Hannegan v. Esquire,
Ina, 327 US. 146 (1946); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963).
160. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
161. Id. at 338 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
162. The Court acknowledged that home visits by welfare caseworkers could indeed
result in criminal prosecution:
If the visitation serves to discourage misrepresentation or fraud, such a by-
product of that visit does not impress upon the visit itself a dominant criminal
investigative aspect. And if the visit should, by chance, lead to the discovery of
fraud and a criminal prosecution should follow, then, even assuming that the
evidence discovered upon the home visitation is admissible, an issue upon
which we express no opinion, that is a routine and expected fact of life and a
consequence no greater than that which necessarily ensues upon another dis-
covery by a citizen of criminal conduct.
Wyman, 400 US. at 323 (internal citations omitted). The Court also remarked that the
home visit "does not deal with crime or with the actual or suspicted perpetrators of the
crime. The caseworker is not a sleuth but rather, we trust, is a friend to one in need."
Id. The Courts holding with respect to this point is, again, a stark departure from that
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a claim that the home visits were unreasonable, even if they
were deemed a search. Among those facts were the public's in-
terest in determining how the "public trust" was being used,1'
the goal of the regulation in promoting "'assistance and rehabil-
itation,' [and] maintaining and strengthening family life,"'" con-
cern about the "possible exploitation of [children]," 165 the fact
that recipients receive "written notice several days in advance of
the intended home visit,"'6 and that the regulation was not re-
lated to criminal law enforcement. 67
Turning to the question of whether a welfare recipient's
right are even implicated in such a search, the Court held that
"visitation in itself is not forced or compelled,"1 68 and that the
welfare recipient "had the 'right' to refuse the home visit, but a
consequence in the form of cessation of aid... flows from that
refusal. The choice," the Court reasoned, "is entirely hers, and
nothing of constitutional magnitude is involved." 69
Like the challenged regulation in Wyman, a requirement
that welfare recipients submit to drug testing imposes as a con-
dition for receipt of welfare the relinquishment of the protec-
tions of the Fourth Amendment. However, both because Wyman
has never been reaffirmed and because drug tests have unequiv-
ocally been deemed searches within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, Wyman will not likely pose a significant obstacle to
a challenge to a drug testing statute or regulation in the context
of welfare administration. However, while a challenge is likely
to pass easily through Wyman's determination that administra-
line of cases which subject administrative searches to the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment. See id. at 331 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967) and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967)). See also infra notes
175 and 176 and accompanying text (discussing administrative searches as searches
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
163. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 318-19.
164. Id. at 319.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 320.
167. Id. at 322-23.
168. Id. at 317.
169. Id. at 324. The dissent took the majority to task for its blunt refusal to ac-
knowledge the reality of what was at stake for the welfare recipient. Justice Douglas ar-
gued that
[tihe penalty here is not, of course, invasion of the privacy of [the welfare re-
cipient), only her loss of federal or state largesse. That, however, is merely re-
phrasing the problem. Whatever the semantics, the central question is whether
the government by force of its largesse has the power to 'buy up' rights guar-
anteed by the Constitution.
Id. at 327-28 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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tive searches in the welfare context are not within the contem-
plation of the Fourth Amendment and that an applicant or re-
cipient waives his or her right upon receipt of the benefit, the
inquiry will be whether a drug test is a "reasonable" search, an
analysis undertaken in a traditional examination of a Fourth
Amendment violation.
F. The Fourth Amendment
The Supreme Court has consistently held that drug testing
is a search contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. Having
ruled on five drug testing cases in the past decade, the Court
has upheld drug testing schemes involving public employees in
safety and security situations and student athletes; and struck
down a Georgia law requiring drug testing of candidates for
public office.1 70
Following the signing of President Ronald Reagan's Execu-
tive Order entitled "Drug-Free Federal Workplaces," in Septem-
ber of 1986,171 both the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
and the Customs Service instituted drug testing plans for their
employees. Those employees subsequently challenged the regula-
tions, and the standards and factors articulated by the court in
the 1989 twin cases, Skinner and Von Raab,172 upholding the
regulations, lay out the framework for subsequent challenges to
drug testing plans.173 The Supreme Court utilized that frame-
work in Vernonia School District No. 47J v. Acton, which upheld
a drug testing scheme for student athletes.174 The strong dissent
authored by Justice Scalia in Von Raab's 5-4 decision, Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Vernonia, and the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Chandler v. Miller striking down a Georgia statute
170. As this comment went to press, the Supreme Court let stand a 1997 Federal
District Court decision which held constitutional "a random drug-program for Executive
Branch employees who work next to the White House in the Old Executive Office Build-
ing." Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Will consider Arbitration's Role at Work, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 3, 1998, at A14 (reporting on Stigile v. Clinton, No. 97-837); see Stigile v.
Clinton, 110 F3d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 66 US.L.W. 3575 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1998).
171. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 7301 note.
172. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
173. See Guthrie, supra note 14, at 587. The composition of the Supreme Court has
changed since Skinner and Von Raab, as well, and the strong dissent that would have
found the testing in Von Raab unconstitutional is likely to be joined by some of the
newer justices, or some of the majority given a different set of facts. For a fuller discus-
sion of this point, see infra Part II.F.6.
174. Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
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which required that candidates for public office submit to drug
testing, provide insight into the direction the Court is likely to
take in the context of a welfare-based challenge.
1. Skinner and Von Raab. Before undertaking an analysis
of whether a drug testing plan violates the Fourth Amendment,
a preliminary inquiry must be made to determine whether the
Amendment even applies. Generally associated with the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment is the traditional police search of
a car or a home, that is, a search in the context of a criminal in-
vestigation. Drug testing by the government, especially where
the results of such a test are not used in a criminal prosecution
and are undertaken, as here, by the department of social ser-
vices, have been called "administrative searches."175 Administra-
tive searches of both homes and businesses have been held sub-
ject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. 176 In addition,
bodily privacy, 77 while not an enumerated right found in the
175. STEPHEN A SALTZBURG & D.J. CAPRA, AMEICAN CRnINAL PROCEDURE 282 (4th
ed. 1992).
176. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 US. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387
US. 541 (1967).
177. While there are certainly degrees of invasiveness involved in any drug test-
from a blood test (a high level of intrusion one Supreme Court justice characterized as
"forcible bloodletting," Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 779 (1966)) to directly-
observed urinalysis (where someone actually watches the subject urinate) to an unob-
served urinalysis-I argue in this Comment that the taking of, observation of, and anal-
ysis of bodily fluids by any means implicates a privacy right. Sweat patches and hair
analysis drug testing procedures do not change my analysis, as they both invade bodily
privacy. For more information about sweat patches, see Cole, supra note 16. For more in-
formation about hair analysis, see Prepared Testimony by Raymond C. Kubacki, Jr.,
Pres. and CEO on Behalf of Psychemedics Corp. Before the House Committee on Com-
merce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations: The PDT-90 Personal Drug Test-
ing Service, Federal News Services (Sept. 26, 1996). See also supra note 121 and accom-
panying text (discussing racial disparities in hair analysis drug testing).
There are two levels to intrusiveness when thinking about a drug test-one is the
obvious argument of the indignity of the test, which may be weakened by the use of a
sweat patch or hair testing. The other, however, deals with the idea of the drug test it-
self-the fact that the government or your employer can monitor what you do to your
own body, the presumption of wrongdoing that accompanies being subjected to a drug
test, and the existential argument that each of us has an inherent right to administer
self-medication, to break the law, if you will, and choose to suffer the consequences. See
Thomas Szasz, Our Right to Drugs 112-13 (1992). See also Cornelius Nestler, Constitu-
tional Principles, Criminal Law Principles and the German Drug Law, 1 BUFF. CRmL L
REv. (forthcoming 1998). But as citizens, our expectation is in taking the risk of break-
ing the law and being caught by traditional law enforcement methods. As Justice
O'Connor argues, see infra Part Im.F.4, methods of law enforcement that are sure to
snare criminal activity may not always be constitutional though the snaring may be
desirable.
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text of the Constitution, falls within what Justice Douglas first
called the "penumbra" of rights granted by the Constitution.78
The right of privacy has also been interpreted as the "right to be
let alone."179
The first level of inquiry is to determine whether a search
has occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, by
asking: (1) who conducted the search and (2) did the subject
upon whom the search was conducted have an actual or reason-
able expectation of privacy? 80 Once the Fourth Amendment is
triggered, the inquiry turns to whether a warrant was necessary
to effect the search,'8 ' whether there was probable cause to es-
tablish the need for the search,8 2 and whether the search was
reasonable.m
The Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by
the government and to "private part[ies] act[ing] as an instru-
ment or agent of the Government." 184 In Skinner, the Railway
Labor Executives' Association and its member labor organiza-
tions challenged regulations promulgated by the Federal Rail-
road Administration (FRA) pursuant to the Federal Railroad
Safety Act of 1970,1S5 which require testing of railroad employ-
ees following accidents, and authorize testing of employees fol-
lowing safety rule infractions. 86 Countering the argument by
178. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479, 484 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 US.
438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 US. 113 (1973); Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 US.
678 (1977); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 US. 449, 462 (1958) (1st Amendment freedom of as-
sociation protects privacy from government intrusion); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 US. 516
(1960) (compelling state interest needed to justify intrusion on personal liberty); Mc-
Laughlin v. Florida, 379 US. 184 (1964) (means of intrusion on personal liberty must be
necessary for accomplishment of permissible policy).
179. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 195 (1890) (quoting THOmAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF ToRs OR THE
WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CoNTRACT 29 (1888)).
180. See Katz v. United States, 389 US. 347, 351 (1967).
181. U.S. CONSr. amend IV: "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized." Warrants protect citizens against random and arbi-
trary acts of the government by ensuring an objective determination for the need of an
intrusion made by a neutral and detached magistrate. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Ex-
ecutives' Ass'n, 489 US. 602, 621-22 (1989).
182. U.S. CONS?. amend IV.
183. Id. ("The right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable
searches . .. ."); see United States v. Sharpe, 470 US. 675, 682 (1985) (Fourth Amend-
ment does not proscribe all searches, only those that are unreasonable).
184. Skinner, 489 US. at 614 (collecting cases).
185. Law of Oct. 16, 1970, ch. 13, 84 Stat. 971, repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272,
§ 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 (1994).
186. See Skinner, 489 US. at 606.
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the Secretary of Transportation that private railroads imple-
menting drug and alcohol testing procedures were not acting as
state agents, the Court held that "[w]hether a private party
should be deemed an agent or instrument of the Government for
Fourth Amendment purposes necessarily turns on the degree of
the Government's participation in the private party's activi-
ties."187 Citing the Government's enactment of legislation di-
recting the Secretary of Transportation to promulgate such reg-
ulations as "clear indic[ia] of [its] encouragement, endorsement,
and participation" in the FRA testing scheme, the Court found
that the Fourth Amendment was implicated.188
Turning to whether railroad employees had a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" against a drug or alcohol test, the Court
pointed to the fact that it has "long recognized that a 'compelled
intrusio[n] into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol con-
tent' must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search." 89 Further,
the Court added that "it is obvious that this physical intrusion,
penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of pri-
vacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The en-
suing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain physiological
data is a further invasion of the tested employee's privacy."190
While not a surgical intrusion like the search in Schmerber v.
California, the Court found persuasive the fact that the testing
procedures in Skinner could "reveal a host of private medical
facts about an employee."191 Additionally persuasive was the pro-
cess of collecting the sample to be tested, which consisted of
"visual or aural monitoring of the act of urination, itself impli-
cat[ing a] privacy interest[ ]."192
The Court dispensed with both the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment and the need for probable cause by rely-
ing on the "special needs" doctrine. An exception to the warrant
requirement exists "when 'special needs,' beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
requirement impracticable." 193 Addressing probable cause, the
Court found that "[w]hen the balance of interests precludes in-
sistence on a showing of probable cause... 'some quantum of
187. Id. at 614.
188. Id. at 615-16.
189. Id. at 616 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767-68).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 617.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 619 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 US. 868, 873 (1987)). The "need"
identified here is the government's interest in "regulating the conduct of railroad em-
ployees to ensure safety.7 Id. at 620.
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individualized suspicion!" is necessary for a search to be reason-
able.194 However, "a showing of individualized suspicion is not a
constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed un-
reasonable,"19 5 the Court determined, imposing a balancing test:
"where the privacy interests implicated by the search are mini-
mal, and where an important governmental interest furthered
by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement
of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite
the absence of such suspicionm
Weighing the privacy interests of the railroad employees
against the government's interest in maintaining safe rail
travel, the Court found that the privacy interests of the employ-
ees were dnninished by the fact that they regularly had to un-
dergo tests as part of physical exams and that they were em-
ployed in a highly-regulated industry.'97 Additionally, the Court
found the intrusiveness of the tests were minimal, revealing
only the presence of alcohol or controlled substances, neither of
which the employee has a legitimate privacy interest. 198
Balanced against these diminished interests were the likeli-
hood of great loss of human life and the fact that drug use or
impairment are not otherwise detectable on employees over
whom there is no constant and direct supervision.99 The Court
reasoned that "[e]mployees subject to the tests discharge duties
fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momen-
tary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences."20 The
Court therefore found a nexus between the human loss and the
need for the challenged activity. In other words, it found that
the remedy chosen by the government in this case did indeed
address the problem it sought to counter.
Performing a similar analysis in Skinner's companion case,
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the Court up-
held a drug testing scheme for customs employees who were ei-
ther directly involved in drug interdiction or the enforcement of
related laws or required to carry firearms or handle classified
materials. Again, basing its determination on the special needs
doctrine, the court found the random, suspicionless testing con-
194. Id. at 624 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976)).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 627 & 628 n.8.
198. See id. at 626-27.
199. See id. at 628.
200. Id.
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ducted by the United States Customs Service constitutional. 0 1
In this case, the nexus between the harm to be avoided, corrup-
tion of the integrity of the Nation's borders, and the means by
which the government sought to avoid the harm, drug testing
Customs employees, was not so clear.
202
2. The dissent in Von Raab. Justice Scalia, who joined the
majority in Skinner, dissented in Von Raab. The focus and tone
of his dissent, and the fact that he joined the majority in up-
holding the drug testing scheme in Vernonia, is significant be-
cause Scalia is one of the Court's staunchest conservatives; his
decision in a future challenge in the welfare context is crucial to
reaching a majority of the Court.203
Focusing on the lack of supporting data, Scalia wrote that
"It]he Court's opinion [in Von Raab] will be searched in vain for
real evidence of a real problem that will be solved by urine test-
ing of Customs Service employees." 204 Scalia was persuaded in
Skinner by hard statistics which established the existence of a
problem, and was troubled by the fact that the only "plausible
points" raised by the government in Von Raab were "supported
by nothing but speculation, and not very plausible speculation
at that."2 5 He added that "dispositively absent" in the Govern-
ment's justifications was "the recitation of even a single instance
in which any of the speculated horribles actually occurred" 2°6
Justice Scalia pointed to the majority's rhetoric, highlight-
ing its reliance on such circular platitudes invoked to justify the
testing of customs officials as: "The Customs Services is our Na-
tion's first line of defense against one of the greatest problems
affecting the health and welfare of our population." 20 7 He also
unwound the tenuous connection between the undocumented
problem and the harms cited by the government likely to result:
bribery of officials, temptation, exposure to drugs, and sympathy
201. Von Raab, 489 US. at 679.
202. See id. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
203. For an intriguing look at Justice Scalia and his seemingly incongruous vote in
Von Raab and many criminal procedure cases, see George Kannar, The Constitutional
Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE W. 1297 (1990). See also Christopher E. Smith,
Justice Antonin Scalia and Criminal Justice Cases, 81 KY. L.J. 187 (1992).
204. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 682. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia notes that none of the possible scena-
rios of corruption introduced by the Government were plausible, except in a case where
addiction was so severe as to impair the judgment of the Customs official to the point
that "it would be detectable even without benefit of a urine test." Id.
206. Id. at 683.
207. Id. at 682.
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of border officials for smugglers. Of this, Scalia writes: "all this
contains much that is obviously true, and much that is relevant;
unfortunately, what is obviously true is not relevant, and what
is relevant is obviously not true."208
Observing that the only plausible justification for the drug
testing scheme in Von Raab was the one offered by the Commis-
sioner of Customs-that the drug testing program set an exam-
ple in this country's struggle with drugs, the "most serious
threat to our national health and security,"20 9 Scalia remarked
sardonically:
What better way to show that the Government is serious about its "war
on drugs" than to subject its employees on the front line of that war to
this invasion of their privacy and affront to their dignity? To be sure,
there is only a slight chance that it will prevent some serious public
harm resulting from Service employee drug use, but it will show to the
world that the Service is "clean," and-most important of all-will
demonstrate the determination of the Government to eliminate this
scourge of our society. I think it obvious that this justification is unac-
ceptable; that the impairment of individual liberties cannot be the means
of making a point; that symbolism, even symbolism for so worthy a cause
as the abolition of unlawful drugs, cannot validate an otherwise unrea-
sonable search.210
Justice Scalia was similarly concerned that private citizens
would be subjected to urine testing, and noted: "there is no rea-
son why this super-protection against harms arising from drug
use must be limited to public employees; a law requiring similar
testing of private citizens who use dangerous instruments such
as guns or cars, or who have access to classified information,
would also be constitutional."2 11 He concluded his dissent with a
scathing commentary on the assault on the Fourth Amendment's
protection of privacy:
Those who lose because of the lack of understanding that begot the pres-
ent exercise in symbolism are not just the Customs Service employees,
whose dignity is thus offended, but all of us-who suffer a coarsening of
our national manners that ultimately give the Fourth Amendment its
content, and who become subject to the administration of federal officials
whose respect for our privacy can hardly be greater than the small re-
spect they have been taught to have for their own.212
208. Id.
209. Id at 686 (quoting the Commissioner of Customs).
210. Id. at 686-87.
211. Id. at 686.
212. Id. at 687.
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3. Vernonia. An Oregon high school plan to drug test high
school athletes came before the Court in 1995 after seventh-
grader James Acton and his family refused to submit to the test
before football season. Acton filed suit against the school district
claiming that the drug testing policy violated both the Fourth
Amendment and Oregon's constitution.213 The challenged plan
was random and suspicionless; each week of the sports season
ten percent of all student athletes would be randomly selected
and tested.214 The specimen for urinalysis was to be taken using
limited visual and aural monitoring and sent to a laboratory for
analysis for amphetamines, cocaine, and marijuana.215 Athletes
who tested positive were tested a second time, and if the second
test produced a positive result, a meeting between the school
and the parents was convened, and the student was given the
option of submitting to weekly drug tests or being suspended
from the sports program.216 In analyzing the District's plan, the
Court followed the Skinner and Von Raab framework, laying out
the requirements for a Fourth Amendment claim, describing the
Special Needs doctrine, applying it, and weighing the privacy in-
terest, the level of intrusion, and government interest involved.
Careful to distinguish this case from other contexts in which
drug testing might arise, the Court based its decision largely on
the privacy interest involved, holding that students have a di-
minished interest in privacy and diminished rights in general.217
Student athletes in particular have a lesser expectation of pri-
vacy, the Court explained, because of the various other incur-
sions on privacy student athletes must endure-from public
showers to frequent medical examinations. 21 8 Central to the
Court's decision was the nature of the relationship between the
school district and the student athletes. The government had a
responsibility "under a public school system, as guardian and
213. Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 US 646, 648-51 (1995). See generally
Jennifer L. Malin, Comment, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton: A Further Erosion of
the Fourth Amendment, 62 BRooz L. REv. 469 (1996); Note, A Casualty of the IVar on
Drugs' Mandatory, Suspicionless Drug Testing of Student Athletes in Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton, 74 N.C.L REV. 833 (1996); Joaquin G. Padilla, Comment, Vernonia
School District 47J v. Acton: Flushing the Fourth Amendment-Student Athlete's Privacy
Interests Go Down the Drain, 73 DENVER U. L REv. 571 (1996); Michael D. Mosser, Note,
Random Drug Testing High School Student Athletes in Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton: Is the War on Drugs a Losing Battle for the Fourth Amendment?, 17 WHIrrmR L.
REv. 527 (1996).
214. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 650.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 651.
217. Id. at 657. See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 US. 325 (1985).
218. Vernonia, 515 US. at 657.
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tutor of children entrusted to its care."219 In addition to this
"guardianship" relationship, balanced against the students' di-
minished interest in privacy, was a drug problem of "epidemic"
proportions at the Oregon high school, demonstrated by the re-
cord . 0 Justice Ginsberg concurred with the majority, but wrote
separately to emphasize the choice students athletes had to es-
chew testing, and the relative severity of the sanction, which
was simply a disqualification from intramural athletics.221
4. Vernonia's dissent. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice
Stevens and Justice Souter, authored the dissent in Vernonia,
focusing on the plan's lack of individualized suspicion. Detailing
the history of the Fourth Amendment and the intent of the
Framers to proscribe blanket searches and searches conducted
on general warrant, she wrote:
[Tihe individualized suspicion requirement has a legal pedigree as old as
the Fourth Amendment itself, and it may not be easily cast aside in the
name of policy concerns. It may only be forsaken, our cases in the per-
sonal search context have established, if a suspicion-based regime would
likely be ineffectual.2
O'Connor argued that the Court's own view of suspicionless
searches has generally been that they are unreasonable.22 3 In
cases where such searches were upheld, the intrusion on privacy
was minimal.2  O'Connor noted, "monitored urination combined
with urine testing is more intrusive than some personal
searches [and that] the collection and testing of urine is ... a
search of the person, one of only four categories of suspect
searches the Constitution mentions by name:"2 Distinguishing
Vernonia from Skinner and Von Raab, where "even one unde-
tected instance of wrongdoing could have injurious consequences
219. Id. at 665.
220. Id. at 649.
221. Id. at 666 (Ginsberg, J., concurring). This is not the first time Justice Gins-
berg's opinion has focused on the severity of the outcome of a particular decision. See
also Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1003 (1996) (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
222. Venonia, 515 US. at 678 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
223. See id. at 671-72 (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) in which the
Court invalidated a patdown "sweep" for weapons of all patrons in a tavern where prob-
able cause existed to believe drug dealing was taking place in the tavern).
224. Id. at 672 (citing Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 US. 444 (1990))
("upholding the brief and easily avoidable detention, for purposes of observing signs of
intoxication, of all motorists approaching a roadblock.").
225. Id.
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for a great number of people,"226 O'Connor found the district's
policy an exaggerated response which casted too wide a net in
its attempt to ferret out student athlete users. 227 Justice
O'Connor criticized the Court and the district for attempting to
solve the problem of drug abuse by shunting the requirements
of the Constitution, arguing that
a suspicion-based scheme... may not be as effective as a mass, suspi-
cionless testing regime. In one sense, that is obviously true-just as it is
obviously true that suspicion-based law enforcement is not as effective as
mass, suspicionless enforcement might be. But there is nothing new in
the realization that Fourth Amendment protections come with a price.221
More significantly, O'Connor sought to place into proper per-
spective the governmental need prong of the test used to justify
an intrusive search. She wrote that
it remains the law that police cannot, say, subject to drug testing every
person entering or leaving a certain drug ridden neighborhood in order
to find evidence of crime... [a]nd this is true even though it is hard to
think of a more compelling government interest than the need to fight
the scourge of drugs on our streets and in our neighborhoods. 22 9
5. Chandler v. Miller. On April 15, 1997, the Supreme
Court struck down a Georgia statute that required candidates
for public office in that state to submit to drug testing to certify
that they are drug free.230 Stressing the fact that there are a
"limited number of circumstances in which suspicionless
searches are warranted," the Court found that the state's "certi-
fication requirement [was not] warranted by a special need."231
Rejecting the state's arguments that a candidate's use of drugs
(1) "draws into question an official's judgment and integrity," (2)
"jeopardizes the discharges of public functions," and (3) "under-
mines public confidence and trust in elected officials," the Court
chose to focus on the lack of any "concrete danger" to the public
against which the Georgia law would protect.
226. Id. at 675.
227. In arguing the pervasiveness of the problem, O'Connor asserted that the dis-
tiict demonstrated its clear ability to flag problem students for suspicion-based testing.
I at 678-79.
228. Id. at 680 (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987) (internal quotation
omitted)).
229. Id. at 673.
230. Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997).
231. Id. at 1303.
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Instead of concrete danger, what the law was designed to
protect, and what the Court found at stake, was Georgia's im-
age: the "display [of] its commitment to the struggle against
drug abuse."2 2 Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg wrote
that "[w]here the risk to public safety is substantial and real
blanket, suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank
as 'reasonable'... where public safety is not genuinely in jeop-
ardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search,
no matter how conveniently arranged."3
6. Success of a Challenge to Drug Testing in a Welfare Con-
text. Much of the analysis presented here has dealt with random
and suspicionless drug testing. Challenge levied against such
plans will focus on overbreadth and the nature of the govern-
mental interest at stake. The Special Needs doctrine used by
the court in Skinner and Von Raab instructs that random and
suspicionless drug testing is permissible as long as a strong gov-
ernment interest outweighs the implicated privacy interest and,
as implied in Skinner, the nexus between the harm to be
avoided and the means for avoiding the harm is sufficiently
strong. The Chandler decision significantly narrowed the cir-
cumstances under which a search would be considered reasona-
ble, holding that but for a risk to public safety, suspicionless
drug testing schemes will fall outside of the "closely guarded
category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless
searches." 23 4 In addition, while the intensely strong invective
against drug use and the seemingly endless list of horribles
paraded before the public often serve to "make the case" in the
eyes of the public that drugs are the "but for" cause of most of
the crime, poverty, and "breakup of the American family" they
witness and experience, it is unlikely that the Court will simply
take judicial notice of either the connection, or the disputed
scope of the problem.0 5
However, most states have chose some sort of screening pro-
cess to identify those welfare applicants and recipients who are
232. Id. at 1298.
233. Id. at 1305.
234. Id. at 1296-97.
235. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (dispute over statistics demonstrat-
ing prevalence of drug use among welfare population). See also Von Raab, 489 US. at
683 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (TPerhaps concrete evidence of the severity of a problem is un-
necessary when it is so well known that courts can almost take judicial notice of it...
that is surely not the case here."); see also Duke, supra note 21, at 575 (arguing that the
nexus is not between illegal drugs and oft-cited social ills, but between drug prohibition
and those ills).
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suspected of using drugs. Arguably, once a person is identified
as a drug user, he or she becomes a "target," subject to privacy
intrusion in the first instance, and sanction or treatment re-
quirements should he or she test positive. Thus, as a target,
such a person should be protected by the traditional Fourth
Amendment safeguards applied in a criminal context. A consti-
tutional challenge rests on two factors: sufficient due process
and reasonableness. The preliminary inquiry, whether the appli-
cant or recipient was afforded sufficient due process, would fo-
cus on what factors a social services official relied upon to make
a determination that the individual was a drug users, and what
mechanisms are in place for the applicant or recipient to chal-
lenge the determination. The factors relied upon by the social
services official should amount to a finding of "probable cause,"
that degree of suspicion required for conducting a warrantless
search in the criminal context.26
Crucial to determining how the -Supreme Court might han-
dle a challenge to drug testing in a welfare context is an exami-
nation of the changes in the composition of the Court from 1989
to today, and how the dissents in Von Raab and Vernonia pre-
dict which way the Court will turn. It should be noted at the
outset that the Court's stand in Chandler v. Miller was eight-to-
one, accompanied by a short written opinion, and a dissent from
Justice Rehnquist that lacked that Justice's regular fervor and
substance.2 7 However, proponents of drug testing welfare recipi-
ents are likely to present much stronger justifications than the
State of Georgia did in Chandler, including but not limited to:
the welfare of children, the purpose that welfare serves in the
lives of its recipients (for example, maximizing self-sufficiency,
promoting "independence"), and the way in which a recipient
spends the "public trust." The Court will be called upon to bal-
ance these interests against the privacy interests of welfare ap-
plicants and recipients.
Despite his vote with the majority in Skinner, and given his
dissents in Von Raab and Vernonia, and his proclivity to provide
a liberal counter-balance to the Court's solid conservative major-
236. Probable cause has been defined as [elvidence which, when viewed by a per-
son of reasonable caution, in light of the person's training and experience, would permit
the person to conclude that a fact probably exists' HARRY I. SuBIN, CHESTER L. MIRSKY, &
IAN S. WEINSTEIN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTIONS 11
(1993) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949)). Implicit in a determina-
tion of probable cause, then, would be an examination of the qualifications of the social
services official making the determination.
237. See Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1305-08 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ity Justice Stevens would most likely find any random suspi-
cionless drug testing scheme unconstitutional. Justices Rehn-
quist and Kennedy, both in the majority in Skinner, Von Raab,
and Vernonia, are unlikely to reverse their positions on the is-
sue. Both are likely to view the state's interest in keeping active
drug users off of the welfare rolls as a compelling government
interest sufficient to overcome a recipient or applicant's privacy
rights.
Justice Ginsberg's concurrence in Vernonia and her opinion
in Chandler indicate a reluctance to buy into a symbolic testing
scheme at the expense of the protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment.2 8 Additionally, Justice Ginsburg was concerned about the
severity of the sanction in Vernonia, emphasizing that a denial
of cash assistance is too severe a sanction to impose for the gov-
ernment interest at stake.
Justices Scalia and O'Connor are critical: both authored
strong dissents, for different reasons, in Von Raab and Vernonia
respectively. Additionally, both justices recognize the intrusive
nature of drug testing and have denounced the assault on pri-
vacy in strong terms.239
Justice O'Connor has been particularly concerned about the
Fourth Amendment's requirement of individualized suspicion.
She attributed her approval of a suspicionless drug testing
scheme in Skinner and Von Raab to the difficulty of conducting
individual scrutiny of employees and the cost to society of one
employee impaired by drug use.m To address these concerns, a
plaintiff must argue that random, suspicionless drug testing
plans sweep too broadly and that the immediacy and threat of
harm that existed in Skinner, and arguably in Von Raab, do not
exist in a welfare context.241 Additionally, the relationship that
238. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Question Georgia Law Requiring Drug
Tests for State Candidates, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 15, 1997, at A15.
239. See Von Raab, 489 S. Ct. at 680, 681, 684-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Vernonia,
515 t.S. at 673-686 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
240. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 673-76 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
241. Unless, of course, one argues that the harm is to the welfare recipient his or
herself A recent district court case addressed this argument. Ascolese v. SEPTA, 925 F.
Supp. 351 (ED. Pa. 1996) invalidated a plan to test employees for pregnancy prior to in-
stituting a mandatory exercise program. The court held that while SEPTA was not re-
quired to adopt the least intrusive approach, SEPTA "may [not] adopt any means of
achieving its goals that it finds convenient, irrespective of the existence of other means
of doing so that are as effective an far less intrusive." Ascolese, 925 F. Supp. at 356 n.2.
It also found that "SEPTA does ... have some interest in protecting the health of its
employees and their children. But it cannot assert that it has undertaken a 'special re-
sponsibility of care and direction' of-the sort that Justice Scalia found to justify drug
testing in Vernonia." Id at 356. Therefore, the court acknowledged that while "[a] pater-
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exists between a welfare caseworker and a recipient is such that
there is ample opportunity to observe the demeanor of the recip-
ient. This "opportunity to observe" will become even greater as
recipients begin daily contact with welfare-to-work employment
counselors and transitional employers.
Documented evidence of an existing problem and a clearly
articulated nexus between the problem and the proposed solu-
tion will be important in Justice Scalia's analysis.24 Demonstra-
tion of an existing problem of drug use among the welfare popu-
lation will be a hotly contested issue, with a state citing
favorable statistics on the one hand and the challengers coun-
tering with their own statistics and the argument that drug use
is no more prevalent among welfare recipients than in the gen-
eral population. 2 A state government is likely to present two
different arguments regarding the nexus. First, linking welfare
recipients on drugs to the public coffers, and second, linking
welfare recipients on drugs to the social ills of poverty, crime,
and family breakup. Where testing in Skinner was designed to
detect employees who are impaired, thereby avoiding serious
loss of life due to an accident, testing in the welfare context only
identifies drug users and either requires them to seek treat-
ment, which may or may not be available, or cuts them off of
the rolls entirely.
Denying drug users even cash assistance addresses none of
the oft-cited concrete social ills. Those who refuse to test, test
positive and refuse to enter treatment, or test positive and fail
nalistic testing program may have some place in a public school, an institution whose
very function is protective and caretaking in nature," it had no place in a place of work.
Id. at 355. Additionally, the court noted that SEPTA's plan was
unusual in that it [was] intended exclusively to protect the tested officer her-
self and her fetus, rather than being directed at protecting a broader popula-
tion .... the Supreme Court's 'special needs' cases have all-with one excep-
tion ... involved searches directed at promoting the safety or interests of a
broader population than the tested individual.
Id.
The same point is implicit in Rutherford v. Albuquerque, 77 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir.
1996) which likewise found a drug test which was used in the dismissal of a bus driver
who tested positive upon return to work after an extended illness unconstitutional. The
Rutherford court noted that the fact that drugs are detected in the system of someone
who has not worked in a year says nothing about that individual's work behavior. The
Rutherford court placed the emphasis on the petitioner's behavior and its potential to af-
fect others, and not the act of the drug use itsell
242. See supra Part m.F.2. Public policy will not be a consideration for Scalia, who
once said, "I don't deal with policy, thaes not my business. I gave it up when I took the
veil. Kannar, supra note 203, at 1320 n.12 (quoting Justice Scalia at Brooklyn College,
Conservative Justice Draws Fire After Speech, TBE KINGsmAN, Oct. 23, 1989, at 1).
243. See supra note 83.
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to complete treatment will have less money to spend on subsis-
tence for themselves and their families, and less money to spend
on preventive healthcare and nutritional needs. Guthrie argues
that "denying welfare to drug users will only eliminate that
class of substance abusers from the welfare rolls; it will not
eliminate drug use and crime among the destitute. It seems
senseless to make poor drug addicts suddenly poorer and, there-
fore, more desperate to commit income-generating crimes."2"
CONCLUSION
In addition to the constitutional, statutory, and doctrinal
bases which may serve to invalidate plans which condition re-
ceipt of welfare on drug testing, public policy and an under-
standing of drug use and addiction demand their rejection. It is
widely recognized in the international community that in order
for treatment to actually work it must be available when the
user is ready to commit him or herself to it; it must be non-
punitive; it must accord the user dignity and respect; it must al-
low the user to maintain a decent standard of living; and it
must assume some degree of relapse. 245 Punitive measures
which sanction applicants and recipients who test positive for
drugs fail at each level. If such plans are aimed solely at remov-
ing those who choose to use substances that are illegal from
welfare rolls, strictly enforcing its provisions will accomplish
such a goal. But, if states want to address problem substance
use, at a minimum, they should expand the capacity - and di-
244. Guthrie, supra note 14, at 585. Guthrie ackmowledged that "this a controversial
assertion," but presented "data showing that drug abusers commit crimes to support
their addictions." Id. (citing Carl D. Chambers, Narcotic Addiction and Crime: An Em-
pirical Review, in DRUGS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 125-42 (James Inciardi &
Carl D. Chambers eds. 1974)); Leroy Gould, Crime and the Addict: Beyond Common
Sense, in DRUGS AND THE CaRMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra, at 57-73; James C. Weissman,
Understanding the Drugs and Crime Connection, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND DRUGS 55, 72
(James C. Weissman & Robert L. DuPont eds., 1982). For a more recent discussion of
this issue, see Duke, supra note 21, at 576-79 (arguing that prohibition against drugs in-
creases the incidence of drug related crime).
245. See Stanton Peele, The Results for Drug Reform Goals of Shifting from In-
terdiction/Punishment to Treatment, 9 INT'L J. OF DRUG POLICY 43 (1998); Reiiarman &
Levine, supra note 37, at 356-57 (citing, inter alia, PAT O'HAIE ET AL, THE REDUCTION OF
DRUG-RELATED HARM (1993); John Strang & M. Farrell, Harm Minimisation for Drug
Misusers, 304 BRIT. MiD. J. 1127 (1992); ETHAN NADELmANN ET AL, THE HARM REDUCTION
APPROACH TO DRUG CONTROL INTERNATIONAL PROGRESS,(1994)); Rone Tempest, Bold Ex-
periment" Drugs: Dutch Gain with a Tolerant Tack, LA. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1989, at 1.
246. Nationally, "there is at present treatment capacity for only a little more than
half of those who need drug treatment Duke, supra note 21, at 588 (citing OFFICE OF
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY; EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PREsDENT, NATIONAL DRUG
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versify24 of treatment facilities. Recidivism rates in traditional,
existing treatment programs, most of which subscribe to the
"disease model" approach to addiction, are abysmal. 4 Threaten-
ing the poorest and often most desperate individuals experienc-
CONTROL STRATEGY 25 (1994)). "Fewer than one-third of states reported that they had
plans to increase state funding for alcohol and drug treatment targeted at welfare recipi-
ents! MAKG WELFARE REFORM WORK, supra note 11, at 39. In a survey conducted with
state alcohol and drug agencies, the Legal Action Center in New York found that of
those eligible for treatment, such treatment was available for only a small percentage in
some states (California, 12.97%; Indiana, 2.71%; Maine, 4.41%; South Carolina, 35.27%,
Texas, 10.73%; Utah, 21.13%; Washington, 21.48%). Id. at 39, Fig. 13. The average per-
centage of those eligible for treatment for whom such treatment was available was
28.75%. Id.
247. Thirty day in-patient detoxification, methadone maintenance, and Narcotics
Anonymous/Alcoholics Anonymous-type 12-step groups, all abstinence based, are the
only available treatment methods in most states. Innovative treatment methods which
are not abstinence based, such as those based on the treatment theory of harm reduc-
tion, face significant obstacles, including the fact that insurance companies will not pro-
vide reimbursement to agencies providing treatment. Current social service regulations
mandate that a welfare recipient required to attend treatment attend such treatment in
a state-approved facility. Approval for new facilities is rare, sometimes taking nearly
three years and arduous certification procedures. Harm reduction programs are not ap-
proved in New York State and are unlikely to be in the near future, despite their success
in other areas of the country and in Europe. Telephone interview with Office of Alcohol
and Substance Abuse Services, Aug. 23, 1996. See also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw art. 23,
§ 23.01 (1989).
248. See generally Peele, supra note 245. Peele describes the "disease model" ap-
proach to addiction as embracing some of the following ideas: addiction is genetic, a per-
son must accept his or her addict identity, claiming a person is "okay" is denial, total ab-
stinence is the only treatment goal, and the person must always think of him or herself
as an addict. He contrasts this with the ideas of what he calls the "life process" ap-
proach. Many of these ideas are embodied in a harm reduction approach: seeing drug
use as a way of coping with life experience, the idea that treatment must fit the individ-
ual, understanding that addiction will vary depending on the situation, identifying nega-
tive consequences for self, improving control and relapse reduction (relapse is as-
sumed-and dealt with accordingly), and outgrowing his or her addiction where one no
longer needs to think of him or herself as an addict. Id. Peele explains that the appeal of
12-step and "disease model" approaches in this country is strongly related to "American
religious fundamentalism... involving public confession, contrition, and restitution." Id.
at 49. See also William R. Miller et al., What Works?: A Methodological Analysis of the
Alcohol Treatment Outcome Literature, in HANDBOOK OF ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT Ap.
PROACHES 12 (Reid K. Hester & William I. Miller eds., 2d ed. 1995) (ranking efficacy of
43 alcohol treatments in terms of 217 published clinical research trials); Lee N. Robins
et al, Vietnam Veterans Three Years After Vietnam: How Our Study Changed Our View
of Heroin, in THE YEARBOOK OF SUBSTANCE USE AND ABUSE 213-30 (Leon Brill & Charles
Winick eds., 1980) (reporting findings that recovery from addiction does not require ab-
stinence and that treatment is not always necessary for remission: of those men addicted
to heroin/morphine in Vietnam who had received treatment, 47% were addicted in the
second year;, and of those not treated, only 17% were addicted); Deborah A. Dawson,
Correlates of Past-Year Status Among Treated and Untreated Persons with Former Alco-
hol Dependence, 20 ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH, 771-79 (1992).
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ing problem drug use will not make generally unsuccessful
treatment methods work any better.
Those who believe that welfare recipients who use drugs
live better than the working poor can easily be disabused of
their notions by reviewing a "Standard of Need" utilized by the
New York State Department of Social Services. In 1997 a single
individual living on his or her own was entitled to $215 for rent,
in a city where some of the cheapest rentals for one-room apart-
ments in lower Manhattan go for more than $500 a month; and
$137.10 for food and other needs, an amount which must suffice
to pay for monthly personal hygiene needs, household cleaning
supplies, clothing, and transportation.2 9
In 1968, the Report of the National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission Report) criticized the
paltry offerings of the AFDC program and its concomitant pro-
scriptions. John Charles Boger noted that the Commission
specifically
pointed to a number of harsh regulations adopted by most state pro-
grams-including a requirement of a year's residence prior to welfare eli-
gibility, 10 a deduction in welfare payments for any amounts earned by
welfare recipients, and the precondition that at least one parent be ab-
sent from the home (the so-called "absent-father' rule)-all of which
tended to demean welfare recipients in their own, and the public's,
eyes.2
1
The federal government has extended some of the most punitive
measures the Kerner Commission criticized thirty years ago,
and it has terminated those the Commission argued to expand.
249. Standard of need for a single individual, N.Y. COMP. CODES P. & RGs. tit. 18,
§ 352.1 (1996). An individual in Erie Co. (Buffalo, NY) is entitled to $169 a month for
housing, a family of two $182, and a family of four $223. Where one "dose" of heroin on
the streets of New York City for an average user is $10 ($20 on the streets in Buffalo,
New York), a heavy, regular user of the drug can expect to pay anywhere from $50 -
$100 dollars a day. It is hard to imagine how even a significant percentage of a drug
user's welfare money could be used to pay for his or her drug habit, much less finance it.
More often than not, drug habits are financed by a loosely organized underground econ-
omy of odd jobs, scams, favors, and illegal activity. Interviews with participants in Lower
East Side Harm Reduction/Needle Exchange program (Summer 1996) and with partici-
pants of Columbus Hospital Syringe Exchange program, Buffalo, N.Y., (Fall 1995). See
also WILSON, supra note 90, at 74-75. A 1983 survey of callers to a Cocaine Hotline
showed that the average caller spent $637 a week on cocaine, with a range of $200 -
$3,200. Duke, supra note 21, at 576 n.22 (citing study).
250. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (declaring new-resident restric-
tions unconstitutional).
251. John Charles Boger, Race and the American City: The Kerner Commission in
Retrospect-An Introduction, 71 N.C.L. Rav. 1289, 1339-340 (1993).
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The drug war in its various incarnations has had a disas-
trous impact on our society.22 Just as many reasoned arguments
are increasingly made to scale the war back, and even to end
it,253 proposals levying harsh sanctions against welfare recipi-
ents who use drugs enjoy wide support in federal and state leg-
islatures. The war on drugs raging against U.S. citizens is a war
not only on the poor. It also implicitly targets women and people
of color.2  The impact of federal sentencing guidelines and drug
law enforcement on African Americans is astoundingly dispro-
portionate, 2 5 and a recent turn of the drug war arsenals on wel-
252. See John T. Curtin, Why a Federal Judge Concludes Drug Legalization is the
Way to Go, BUFF. NEws, Mar. 2, 1997, at 1H; George Soros, The Drug War 'Cannot Be
Won': It's Time to Just Say No to Self-Destructive Prohibition, WASHL POST, Feb. 2, 1997,
at C2; STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR. RETHINKING OUR
TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS (1993); David R. Henderson, A Humane Economist's
Case for Drug Legalization, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 655 (1991) (detailing the economic and
social costs of the drug war); Ethan A. Nadehnann, Commonsense Drug Policy, 77 FoR.
EIGN AFFAIRS 111 (1998).
253. See supra note 252 and sources cited therein; Craig Horowitz, The No-Win War
and its Discontents, 29 DRUG POL Y LETTER 21 (Spring 1996); William F. Buckley, Jr., The
Drug War: Just Not Right, 29 DRUG POL'Y LETTER 34 (Spring 1996). Duke wrote:
We should, of course, hold drug users responsible for the harm they cause to
others while intoxicated on drugs, legal or illegal. We should try to help any
drug abuser who wants help .... But we should not pretend that we can keep
drugs out of the hands of those who want them or that we can, by force of law,
prevent them from using or abusing drugs .... [We cannot solve the problem
by externalizing the costs of drug use. We have good reason as a nation for
feeling guilty about the wretched conditions in which many Americans are
struggling and from which some seek temporary escape through drugs, but
punishing ourselves with crime, corruption, disease, and urban rot is not the
answer.
Duke, supra note 21, at 597.
See also Eva Bertram & Kenneth Sharpe War Ends Drugs Win: Resisters Say We're
Fighting the Wrong Battles, THE NATION, Jan. 6, 1997, at 12 (counting judges, police, fed-
eral and local officials, and military leaders among the "drug war defectors"); Reinarman
& Levine, supra note 37, at 346-47 (compiling similar list and adding- Nobel-prize win-
ning novelist Gabriel Garcia Marquez, the Wall Street Journal, the American Bar Asso-
ciation, the American Public Health Association, and the American Medical Association).
254. See DAVID ZUCCanmO, MYTH OF THE WELFARE QUEEN (1997).
255. African Americans represented fifty-five percent of all state court convictions
for drug felonies in 1992 while constituting only twelve percent of the U.S. population.
Punishment of Drug Offenders, supra note 12, at 985 (citing OFFICE OF JUSTICE PRO-
GRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 1992, at 3,
5 (1996)). Nearly ninety percent of today's state prison population incarcerated for drug
possession is African American or Hispanic. Punishment of Drug Offenders, supra note
12, at 985 (citing Pam Widener, Eddie Ellis at Large, PRISON LIFE, Oct. 1996, at 46, 47).
See also Gillmer, supra note 142 passim; Duke, supra note 21, at 590-595; Mark Mauer
& Tracy Huling, Young Black Americans and the Criminal Justice System, The Sentenc-
ing Project, (Oct. 1995); The Drug War in Black and White, 28 DRUG POL'Y LETTER 1
(Winter 1996). On race and the criminal law generally, see Randall Kennedy, The State,
DRUG TESTING WELFARE RECIPIENTS
fare recipients will multiply existent racism. 256 In addition,
many of the state plans to identify drug users are focused on
women, with suspicion tied to receipt of services for children, or
drug testing provision for women receiving pre-natal care.257
While it is likely that drug testing plans in their various in-
carnations violate state constitutions and the US. Constitution
in light of Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia, and Chandler, the
harm that will result while a court challenge is pending will be
irreversible and unconscionable. 258 Despite efforts to isolate
sanctions to individual "offenders," children and families will be
forced to live on less and single adults will be left without the
means of subsistence. Applicants and recipients battling HIV
and AIDS will be irreparably harmed by the loss of benefits, for
even a short time, where new life-saving drug therapies require
regular and nutritious meals and stable housing.2- 9 Treatment
facilities will be flooded with people who are not ready to enter
treatment, depriving those who are from gaining admission.
Demonizing indigent drug users pushes them further to the
margins of our society and serves them up as scapegoats for a
national problem the government does not have the courage to
address with either common sense or innovative solutions. And,
as Scalia argued in Von Raab, we will all lose some dignity in
the process. 260
Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1255 (1994).
256. Poverty disproportionately affects people of color at a rate three times that of
whites. See Punishment of Drug Offenders, supra note 12, at 985 n.13 (citing BARBARA
EHRENaimH, THE SNARLING CrZFN 180 (1995) and THE REAL WAR ON CRm: THE REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JuSTIcE CoImmsSIoN 150 (Steven IL Donziger ed., 1996) ("In
1992 ... 46 percent of African American children and 39 percent of Hispanic children
were born into poverty, compared to only 16 percent of white children.")). See also W-
SON, supra note 90, at 241-43 (summarizing literature on poverty concentration).
257. See infra Appendix I, nn. 29, 46, 48, & 54.
258. By December 1997, welfare caseloads had dropped by 25% in some states, and
"the number of people receiving benefits has dropped, in some states by as much as
[forty percent]." Welfare Reform Revisited (All Things Considered, NPR radio broadcast,
Dec. 30, 1997) While "food stamp usage is down [and] welfare recipients are getting
hired... most states aren't measuring how long they keep the jobs and aren't trying to
discover whafs happened to those who don't find work." Id.
259. David Bangsberg et al., Protease Inhibitors in the Homeless, 278 JAMA 64
(1997) ("Combinted] chemotherapy with protease inhibitors must be timed around meals,
with some drugs taken with meals and some taken on an empty stomach .... Some
drugs need to be refrigerated.. 7).
260. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 687 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Appendix I
Welfare Recipients and Drug Use
Provisions by State*
[Vol. 46
Drug Drag Testng Drug
Treatment Screening
Suspicion Suspicion- Discretion of
based less Social Services
Department
AL
AK
AZ X_
AR
CA X2
CO X3 X 4
CT 
_ 
X3
DE K'
FL
GA
HA
ID
IL X3 XV
IN X
I0
KS X1 X1 XU
KY X04
LA X1 X16
ME XK7
MD X _ _ X2 X0
MAAwl X21 X2
MN X24 X25
ho X XV X
M0 X
MI"
NE X 
NV X3 2 X3
NH X__
NJ KV X X
NM
NY XK X X 
NC X 41 X42 X3
ND_ X"
OH X4_ X46
OK47 X 
_s
OR X4 X_ 
_
PA Xl X2
RI
SC X"3 XU
SD X
TN
TX X_
UT X__
VT X"
VA X
WA X60
WV 
_X6_
WI X _
WY _ _ _
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* Section 902 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 10 Stat. 2105 (to be codified in scattered sections of
U.S.C.) provides that "[s]tates shall not be prohibited by the Federal Government from
testing welfare recipients for use of controlled substances nor from sanctioning welfare
recipients who test positive for use of controlled substances." What follows is a compre-
hensive look at how individual states responded to section 902.
1. See 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws 300, Ariz. S.B. 1357, 43d Leg., 1st Sess. (child care as-
sistance provided to anyone participating in drug treatment or drug rehabilitation).
2. LEGAL ACTION CENTER, MAKING WELFARE REFORM WORm TooLs FOR CONFRONTING
ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROBLEMS AMONG WELFARE REcIPIENTS 75 (1997) [hereinafter MAKING
WELFARE REFORM WoRK].
3. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-2-701 et seq. (West Supp. 1997) (providing for referral
to treatment for those needing substance abuse services). See also COL REv. STAT. § 26-
2-1111(4XeXI) & (11) (1996) (requiring anyone qualifying for disability solely based on
addiction to participate in state-approved treatment and submit to periodic and random
drug testing).
4. Id. (specifying that anyone testing positive twice in any three month period will
be ineligible for benefits).
5. Act of June 18, 1997, No. 97-2, 1997 Conn. Legis. Serv. Spec. Sess. (West 1997)
(amending CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-112).
6. See id. (relating to convicted drug felons).
7. MAKING WELFARE REFORM WORK, supra note 2, at 79.
8. See 305 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 5/4-19 (West 1997) (creating a demonstration project
wherein clients who have been identified as having "an alcohol or substance abuse prob-
lem must, as a condition of eligibility... participate" in state-approved drug or alcohol
treatment).
9. The Illinois Department of Social Services may institute whatever means it deter-
mines appropriate for ascertaining whether clients have a drug or alcohol problem. Id.
The state instituted a 3-county pilot program "in 1996 to train welfare case workers to
recognize recipients with alcohol and drug problems and refer them for treatment. See
MAKING WELFARE REFORM WORK, supra note 2, at 79.
10. See IND. CODE ANN. § 2-4-1A-10 (Michie 1996) (creating committee to determine
standards for eligibility and methods of delivery of public aid).
11. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-7, 113(a), (c) (1996). Anyone testing positive for drugs
is required to enter and complete drug treatment. Failure to do so will result in "termi-
nation of a portion or all of cash assistance benefits for such recipient." Id. § 39-7,
113(c).
12. Id. § 39-7, 113(a). The 1996 Kanwork Act provides for a pilot drug testing pro-
ject for participants in Kanwork (Kansas' welfare-to-work program), who "have symp-
toms of alcoholism or drug addiction-"
13. Kansas will use C.A.G.E. and SA.S.S.L drug abuse screening tools, and sanc-
tions "would be imposed only if the recipient refuses to comply with the recommenda-
tions of the regional alcohol and drug assessment center." MAKING WELFARE REFORM
WORK, supra note 2, at 80.
14. As part of its Personal Responsibility Plan, Kentucky will provide for referrals
to substance abuse counseling, and will rely on "self-assessment" for drug and alcohol
abuse. See Key Provisions, Kentucky Transitional Assistance Program (K-TAP), Oct. 7,
1997, <http'//cfc-chs.chr.state.ky.us/reform/ktapl.htm> (on file with the Buffalo Law
Review).
15. Pursuant to Louisiana's law, upon a first positive drug test, recipients are re-
quired to complete a treatment program, paid for either by insurance, or borne by the
tested individual him or herself LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1021(E) (West 1997).
16. Id. § 1021(B) (1997). The most comprehensive drug testing statute in the nation,
Louisiana's law provides for random, suspicionless, and mandatory drug testing of any-
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one who receives anything of economic value from the state. Refusal to test or a second
positive drug test would result in the loss of benefits (i.e., termination, removal, loss of
license, loan, scholarship, or public assistance benefit). Id. § 1021(F). The law specifically
provides for the testing of certain adult recipients of public assistance. Upon a first posi-
tive test, individuals are required to complete an education and treatment program as a
condition of continued receipt of benefits. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 460.4(A) (West 1997). Re-
ceipt of public assistance would not be denied to anyone participating in treatment, or if
treatment is unavailable. Id. § 460.4(C).
Convicted drug felons must also submit to drug testing before being reinstated or
deemed eligible for public assistance. See MAKING WELFARE REFORM WORK, supra note 2,
at 76.
17. M. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3788 (West Supp. 1997). Maine's welfare reform
legislation provides that any recipient who cannot fulfill the requirements of Maine's
work program because of a problem with drug or alcohol abuse must enter a treatment
program. Id. at § 3788(11). The law specifies that the requirement is subject to the pro-
visions of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
18. See Welfare Innovation Act of 1997, S.B. 499, ch. 593, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Md.
1997) [hereinafter Maryland Welfare Innovation Act]. An applicant testing positive and
in compliance with the departmenes requirements for testing and treatment will be enti-
tled to full cash assistance and exempt from work requirements during the time he or
she is in treatment. Id. § 1(cX1) and (2). If such applicant is not in compliance, he or she
is given 30 days to comply. If he or she refuses to comply at that point, he or she is ineli-
gible for benefits, and benefits for the rest of the family are paid to a third-party payee.
Id.
19. Maryland's welfare reform legislation requires applicants for and recipients of
public assistance to submit to a health screen, which includes screening for substance
abuse. Maryland Welfare Innovation Act, § 1(b)(2). Upon a positive drug test, the health
care organization administering the health screen must submit an identification form to
the Department of Social Services which indicates that the applicant has tested positive.
Id. § 1(b)(2)(i) and (ii). The law provides that anyone applying for assistance must sign a
medical release that would allow the department of social services access to the results
of any drug test and the results of any referral to substance abuse treatment. Id. §
1(b)(2).
20. Maryland plans to use the C.A.G.E. screening device through Medicaid managed
care plans. See MAKING WELFARE REFORM WORK, supra note 2, at 80.
21. Michigan Governor John Engler proposed "Operation Zero Tolerance" in his
State of the State address, a plan which would require welfare applicants and recipients
to undergo drug testing;, a positive test result would result in a referral to drug treat-
ment, and failure to accept and complete treatment would result in the loss of benefits.
See Editorial, Testing the Constitution, DTrrOIT NEws, Feb. 5, 1998, at A10.
22. MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 40057e (1997). Michigan Law requires families receiv-
ing "family independence assistance? to execute a social contract outlining responsibili-
ties and goals of members of the family. Id. § 40057e(lXe). It requires a recipient "who
fails to comply with the compliance goals due to substance abuse to participate in sub-
stance abuse treatment and submit to any periodic drug testing required by the treat-
ment program Id.
23. Recipients of Medicaid will be screened for alcohol and substance abuse using
the Addiction Severity Index (ASI). See MAKING WELFARE REFORM WORK, supra note 2, at
80.
24. Minnesota law requires those disabled by reason of alcohol or drug addiction to
receive benefits in vendor form if they are not "amenable" to treatment; if they are
"amenable" to treatment, they must be receiving such treatment or on a waiting list for
treatment in order to receive benefits. MINN. STAT. § 256d.05(17) (1997).
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25. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256j.26 (1997). Minnesota's law requires anyone con-
victed of a drug offense after July 1, 1997 to submit to random drug testing in order to
receive shelter and food stamp benefits. Id.
26. Mississippi's law provides that recipients in drug treatment programs and in
compliance with such programs will be exempt from work requirements. See Miss. CODE
ANN. § 41-79-5(2).
27. The authority for eligibility determination is vested with the Mississippi Depart-
ment of Social Services. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-17-5 (1997) (creating Personal Respon-
sibility Contract).
28. Applicants for and recipients of public assistance in Mississippi are required to
submit a self-declaration that they are drug free. See MAKING WELFARE REFORM WORK,
supra note 2, at 80.
29. Missouri provides for drug and alcohol testing of newborns. H.R. 20, 89th Gen.
Ass., 1st Spec. Sess. (Mo. 1997). The law provides for toxicology reports for pregnant wo-
men and newborns, and abrogates physician-patient privilege with regard to such tests,
enabling the state department of health to obtain the results of such tests. See Mo. Ray.
STAT tit. 12 § 191.737 (1996). Section 191.745 (1996) provides for testing of a "statisti-
cally significant sample of women and infants at the time of delivery."
30. Recipients of and applicants for public assistance are required to self-declare
drug or alcohol abuse. See MAKING WELFARE REFORM WORK, supra note 2, at 80.
3L Recipients of and applicants for public assistance who screen positive for drug or
alcohol problems will be referred to drug treatment. See MAKING WELFARE REFORM
WORK, supra note 2, at 80. Failure to comply with treatment will result in sanctions,
which may include protective payments.
32. Compliance with treatment requirements may include submission to drug test-
ing. See id.
33. Upon suspicion of a drug or alcohol problem, recipients will be referred for drug
screening using SAS.S.L See id. at 80.
34. New Hampshire plans to use drug screening assessment tools. See MAKING WEL.
FARE REFORM WORK, supra note 2, at 80.
35. See infra Appendix I1, n.17 (relating to convicted drug felons).
36. See ia
37. New Jersey has created a demonstration project not involving urine testing "to
screen... welfare recipients for alcohol and drug problems and refer them to treat-
ment." See MAKING WELFARE REFORM WORK, supra note 2, at 80.
38. If upon the determination of a social services official an applicant or recipient is
found to be in need of alcohol or drug treatment, "the social services official must refer
the individual to an appropriate alcoholism and/or substance abuse treatment program."
N.Y. COMP. CODES R & REGs. tit. 18, § 351.2(iXlXiii). Sanctions apply to individuals fail-
ing to participate in and complete treatment. Id. § 351.2(iXlXvi) & (2Xiii)-(iv). Likewise,
if an individual fils to consent to disclosure of necessary treatment information to the
social services district, or subsequently revokes such consent, such person will be ineligi-
ble for public assistance." Id. § 351.2(iXlXvii).
39. When the screening process indicates that there is reason to believe that
an applicant or recipient is abusing or dependent on alcohol or drugs, or
there is other evidence that an applicant or recipient is abusing or depen-
dent on alcohol or drugs, the local district must require the applicant or re-
cipient to undergo a formal alcohol or substance abuse assessment, which
may include drug testing ....
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 351.2(iXlXii).
40. Investigation of eligibility for public assistance must include a screening
for alcohol and/or substance abuse of all heads of households and of all
adult household members, using a standardized screening instrument ....
Such screening will be performed at the time of application and periodically
340 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
thereafter, unless the recipient is actively participating in... treatment
... but no more frequently than every six months, unless the district has
reason to believe that an applicant or recipient is abusing or dependent on
alcohol and/or drugs.
18 N.Y. COMP. CODES P. & REGs. § 351.2(iXlXi).
41. See infra Appendix II, n.20 (relating to convicted drug felons).
42. A law approved during the summer of 1997 allows North Carolina counties with
"a total of up to 15.5% of the state's caseload to design their own public-assistance pro-
grams.* John Wagner, Plans Drawn for Welfare Experiment, NEWS & OBsERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Feb. 2, 1998, at Al. Some North Carolina counties will require applicants to take
and pass drug tests before receiving benefits.
43. North Carolina will utilize drug screening tools, and plans to "modify an ex-
isting screening tool to be gender sensitive.! See MAKING WELFARE REFORM WORK, supra
note 2, at 80.
44. Applicants for and recipients of public assistance will be assessed for drug and
alcohol abuse with questions "developed with the state alcohol and drug agency and ...
referral agencies.! See MAKING WELFARE REFORM WORK, supra note 2, at 80. Recipients
must "sign a contract with the welfare agency, which may include assessment and treat-
ment goals." Id.
45. See H.B. 408, 122d Gen Ass., Reg. Seas. (Ohio 1997). Those testing positive
under procedures specified in § 5107-71 of House Bill 408 will receive a referral to drug
treatment. Id. § 5107-71.
46. See id. Ohio's welfare reform legislation authorizes the state department of so-
cial services to select counties where the Department of Alcohol and Drug Addiction Ser-
vices will conduct substance abuse screening of participants in Ohio's welfare-to-work
program who have children receiving or referred for services from the public children's
services agency. The law further provides that pregnant women receiving medical assis-
tance are required to undergo drug screening at their first prenatal medical examina-
tion, and shall be referred to treatment upon a positive test. Id. § 5111.017.
47. Oklahoma's welfare reform legislation provides for a study 'to determine the ex-
tent to which substance abuse interferes with the ability of recipients in the [TANF] pro-
gram to secure and maintain employment leading to self-sufficiency." H.B. 2170, 46th
Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 1997). The study will consider drug testing and concomitant sanc-
tions. Id.
48. See H.B. 2133, 46th Leg., 1st Seas. (Okla. 1997) (requiring drug testing of any
mother, father, legal guardian, legal custodian, stepparent, or other adult living in a
home in the context of a child custody case).
49. See S.B. 825, 69th Leg. Ass. (Or. 1997). Oregon's welfare reform legislation per-
mits the state division of social services to refer to substance abuse treatment individu-
als whom the division "reasonably believes" is in need of such referral. The stats Depart-
ment of Human Resources will develop guidelines for determining who is in need of such
a referral. If, as a result of such referral, an individual is determined to be in need of
treatment, the department will provide such resources as are necessary. Anyone refusing
treatment will be sanctioned by reducing the amount of aid by $50 for a period of two
months. Subsequent refusals will result in a 2-month 'no-aid" sanction, and refusal fol-
lowing such sanction would result in a termination of all aid payments for the family.
50. Drug testing will be a part of Oregon's substance abuse treatment plans; how-
ever, applicants and recipients will be sanctioned for failure to comply with drug treat-
ment, not for positive drug tests. See MARING WELFARE REroRm WORK, supra note 2, at
81.
Oregon Senate Bill 825 establishes 'drug and alcohol free housing" and authorizes
landlords to require a tenant to take a urine drug test to prove that such tenant is drug
free. S.B. 825, 69th Leg. Ass. (Or. 1997). The law also authorizes the landlord to evict
such individual upon a positive test. Id.
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51. Applicants for and recipients of public assistance in Pennsylvania who are deter-
mined to have substance abuse problems must fulfill obligations to remain drug free, in-
cluding the requirement that they participate in treatment. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. § 405.3
(a) (1997) (creating an agreement of mutual responsibility contract).
52. Section 405.3(aX7) of Pennsylvania's welfare reform bill requires those appli-
cants for and recipients of public assistance who are determined to have substance
abuse problems to submit to periodic drug testing.
53. Prior to the passage of federal welfare reform, South Carolina required those
suspected of needing drug or alcohol treatment to participate in a substance abuse pro-
gram. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-5-1190 (Law Co-op. 1996), amended by 1997 S.C. Acts 133
(eliminating alcohol as a ban for eligibility).
54. S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-5-1190 requires applicants for and recipients of public assis-
tance who are suspected of abusing alcohol or drugs, or mothers with children born with
evidence of maternal substance abuse, to submit to either random drug testing, or to
participate in drug treatment. Upon a second positive drug test, a recipient would be-
come ineligible for public assistance.
55. South Dakota will use a 16-item screening for assessing substance abuse. See
MAKwG WELFARE REFORM WORK, supra note 2, at 81.
56. Prior to federal welfare reform, Texas required applicants for and recipients of
public assistance to enter into a personal responsibility agreement to stay drug-free, and
penalizing non-compliance with a $25 sanction. See MANG WELFARE REFORM WORK,
supra note 2, at 77.
57. See infra Appendix H, n.30 (relating to convicted drug felons).
58. Vermont plans to use an A.S.I. screening tool to assess substance abuse
problems. See ILB. 526, 64th Biennial Sess (Vt. 1997). See also MAKING WELFARE REFORM
WOR, supra note 2, at 81.
59. S.B. 841, Reg. Sess. (Va. 1997) authorizes parole and probation officers to notify
the state department of social services when persons under their supervision have tested
positive for drugs twice. Upon notification from parole or probation officers of a recipi-
ent's two failed drug tests, public assistance will be rendered as vendor payments to
third-party payees. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-105.8 (Michie 1997).
60. Applicants for and recipients of public assistance who are determined to have
substance abuse problems are required to participate in treatment. See H.B. 3901
§ 101(3), 55th First Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997) (amending WAS. REV. CODE § 74.08.025
(1981). Section 309 of Washington House Bill 3901 makes ineligible for public assistance
anyone who is unemployable due to drug or alcohol addiction.
61. West Virginia will require applicants for and recipients of public assistance to
sign a form to attest that they are drug free. See MAKiNG WELFARE REFORM WORK, supra
note 2, at 81.
62. See infra Appendix H, n.33 (relating to convicted drug felons). Said to be the
toughest welfare reform law in the country, Wisconsin's W-2 program has no drug test-
ing provisions; however, employment requirements often force recipients to apply for
jobs for which drug testing is a prerequisite. See Jason DeParle, Getting Opal Caples to
Work, N.Y. TIMEs MAGAZINE, Aug. 24, 1997, at 33.
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Appendix II
Restrictions on Receipt of Public Assistance by Convicted Drug
Felons* by State
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* Section 115 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (to be codified in scattered sections of
U.S.C.) "imposes a federal ban on public assistance to any individual who is convicted of
a felony offense which has as an element the possession, use, or distribution of a con-
trolled substance.! Section 115 contains an opt-out provision which allows states to con-
tinue providing public assistance to convicted drug felons if such states enact affirmative
legislation opting out the federal ban. Some states have also chosen to opt-out of section
115 and impose certain conditions and limitations on the receipt of public assistance by
convicted drug felons. What follows is a comprehensive look at how individual states re-
sponded to section 115.
1. Alaskans with drug-related felony convictions will be permitted to receive public
assistance, but not food stamps. See LEGAL ACTION CENTER, MAKING WELFARE REFORM
WoRm ToOLs FOR CoNFRONnNG ALCOHOL AND DRUG PRoBLEMs AMONG WELFARE RECPI-
ENTs 75 (1997).
2. Arkansas officially opted out of PRA § 115, but adopted its own restriction, mak-
ing ineligible for public assistance, including food stamps, those who have been convicted
or those who have pled guilty to a "drug offense. Arkansas Personal Responsibility and
Public Assistance Reform Act, 1997, Ark. H.B. 1295; ARm CODE ANN. § 20-76-409(A)
(Michie 1997).
3. Colorado prohibits those who have been convicted of a drug-related felony from
receiving assistance, unless such an individual has 'taken action toward rehabilitation
such as, but not limited to, participation in a drug treatment program.! 1997 Colo. SB.
120 § 26-2-708(3), 61st Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. The law imposes sanctions on any-
one using food stamps in a drug transaction. Id.
4. An individual convicted of a drug-related offense is eligible for benefits as long as
he or she is participating in a substance abuse, rehabilitation, or testing program, or if
he or she is successfully serving out a probationary period. Act of June 18, 1997, No. 97-
2, Conn. Legis. Serv. Spec. Sess. (West 1997) (amending CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-
112).
5. Benefits will not be denied to an individual who has been convicted of a drug-
related offense, unless such conviction is for trafficking, those convicted of drug-related
offenses must participate fully with work requirements of Florida's welfare law, includ-
ing all substance abuse requirements. 1997 FLA. LAWS Ch. 173, § 9, 414.095(1); S. 566,
Ch. 97-173; 1997 Reg. Sess.
6. Eligibility for public assistance is denied to anyone convicted of a violent felony
offense or a drug-related felony. GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-184(iX4) (1997).
7. Drug-related felons must either be in treatment or have not refused or failed to
comply with treatment. ILB. 480, 19th State Leg. (Haw. 1997). Rejecting the federal ban,
Hawaii's law notes that
[w]ithholding temporary assistance for needy families funds and food stamps
could push individuals who have served their time deeper into poverty and
could overburden already limited local resources leading to: increased home-
lessness; hunger, family breakup; abuse and neglect; deteriorating educational
achievement for children; poorer overall health and an increase in health-re-
lated expenditures; and increased costs for criminal justice programs and agen-
cies. Further, withholding public assistance will greatly increase the likelihood
that these individuals will commit further offenses.
Id.
8. Ilinois law prohibits those convicted of certain dirug-related felonies from receiv-
ing cash assistance. Act of June 19, 1997, No. 90-17 § 10, 1997 I1. Legis. Serv. (West
1997). Subsection (B) prohibits those convicted of other drug-related felonies from receiv-
ing cash assistance for two years from the date of conviction, unless such a person is in
a drug-treatment program. Subsection (C) prohibits those convicted of certain drug-
related felonies from receiving food stamps.
344 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
9. See S. 516, 77th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (Iowa 1997). Convicted drug felons must par-
ticipate in drug treatment unless exempt for good cause. See MAKING WELFARE REFORM
WORK, supra note 1, at 76.
10. Drug felons with convictions after August 22, 1996 will be ineligible for public
assistance. See Key Provisions, Kentucky Transitional Assistance Program (K-TAP), Oct.
7, 1997, <http'J/ cfc-chs.chr.state.ky.us/reform/ktapl.htm> (on file with the Buffalo Law
Review).
11. Public assistance will be denied to convicted drug felons for one year starting
with the date of conviction or date of release, if sentenced to incarceration. Convicted
drug felons must submit to drug testing before being reinstated or deemed eligible for
public assistance. See MAKING WELFARE REFORM WORK, supra note 1, at 76.
12. Recipients who comply with treatment are eligible. Those who are not compliant
with treatment plans will have 30 days to establish compliance. In the absence of com-
pliance, such individuals are rendered ineligible for assistance, and benefits to the fam-
ily are paid to a third party. See MAKING WELFARE REFORM WORK, supra note 1, at 76.
13. Minnesota will require anyone convicted of a drug offense after July 1, 1997, in
order to receive shelter and food stamp benefits, to: (1) accept payment of rent and utili-
ties in vendor form, and (2) submit to random drug testing. Minn. Ch. Law 85, 80th
Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1997). In addition,
convicted individuals are ineligible for cash assistance for five years following
his or her conviction, unless such person is participating in drug treatment,
has successfully completed drug treatment, or has been determined by the
county not to require drug treatment. Such an individual must submit to ran-
dom drug testing as a condition of continued eligibility. Upon a positive drug
test, benefits will be suspended for five years; in the event of a conviction of
another drug offense, five year benefit suspension.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256j.26 (West 1997).
14. See MONT. CODE ANN § 53-4-231(3)(I) (1997).
15. Convicted drug felons must be participating in, or have completed, a state-
approved drug treatment program, and must demonstrate to the welfare division that he
or she has not possessed, used, or distributed controlled substances since he or she be-
gan the program. Additionally, convicted drug felons who are pregnant, and who obtain
certification from a physician that "the health and safety of the mother and child are de-
pendent on the receipt of benefits" will be exempt from the ban. See MAKING WELFARE
REFORM WORK, supra note 1, at 76.
16. See MAKING WELFARE REFORM WORK, supra note 1, at 76.
17. An individual convicted of a drug-related felony offense is ineligible for public
assistance unless such an individual has successfully completed a treatment program
approved by the state. 1997 N.J. Laws 14, § 5(b). Such an applicant must test negative
for drugs sixty days after completion of treatment. Id.
18. Pregnant women who are convicted drug felons will be eligible for benefits,
which will be issued as protective third-party payments. See MAKING WELFARE REFORM
WORK, supra note 1, at 76.
19. S.B. 5788, 220th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997).
20. See S.B. 1015, § 108A-27.7(D), Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1997). Convicted drug felons will
be required to enter treatment in order to be eligible for assistance. See MAKING WEI,
FARE REFORM WORK, supra note 1, at 76.
21. An individual convicted of a felony offense after July 1, 1997, will be ineligible
for benefits. See MAKING WELFARE REFORM WORK, supra note 1, at 77.
22. See id.
23. See H.B. 2170, 46th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 1997).
24. Section 46 of Oregon Senate Bill 825 provides that "no otherwise eligible con-
victed drug-felon will be denied food stamp assistance." S.B. 825, 69th Leg. Ass. (Or.
1997).
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25. See MAKING WELFARE REFORM WonK, supra note 1, at 77.
26. Rhode Island created its own ban on convicted drug felon receipt of public assis-
tance. See Act of July 3, 1997, Ch. 171, § 40-5.1-8(m), R.L Pub. Laws 171.
27. South Carolina will allow convicted drug felons to receive public assistance if
they submit to drug testing and/or participate in drug treatment. See MAKING WELFARE
REFoEm WoRK, supra note 1, at 77. Such recipients will be ineligible upon a positive ran-
domly admini tered test, or upon another drug-related conviction. Id.
28. See id.
29. An individual convicted of a felony offense after July 1, 1997, will be ineligible
for benefits. See id.
30. Utah House Bill 269 requires convicted drug felons to receive treatment, or to
"make progress towards overcoming the dependency! H.B. 269, 52d Leg., Gen. Sess.
(Utah 1997).
31. Vermont implemented a plan to study the impact of federal welfare reform on
Vermont welfare recipients, authorizing the state department of social services to receive
conviction records for all current recipients. H.B. 526, § 266, 64th Biennial Sess. (Vt.
1997).
32. Washington law requires convicted drug felons to, as a condition of eligibility, (a)
be assessed as having a chemical dependency problem and be participating in treatment,
and (b) not have been convicted of a drug-related felony in the three years prior to the
disabling condition. H.B. 3901, § 101(4), 55th First Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997)
33. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 49.141-161 (West Supp. 1996). Convicted drug felons will
be required to submit to drug testing. Upon a positive test, recipients are sanctioned
with a 15% cash benefit reduction and required to participate in treatment. Convicted
drug felons will also be ineligible for food stamps for 12 months from application date;
they must submit to drug testing, and the test result must be negative in order to be eli-
gible for benefits. See MAKING WELFARE REFORm WoRK, supra note 1, at 77.

